Making the Right Gamble: The Odds On Probable Cause by Bacigal, Ronald J.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
2004
Making the Right Gamble: The Odds On Probable
Cause
Ronald J. Bacigal
University of Richmond, rbacigal@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Fourth Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable Cause, Symposium on The Tools to Interpret the Fourth Amendment, 74
Miss. L.J. 279 (2004).
MAKING THE RIGHT GAMBLE: THE 
ODDS ON PROBABLE CAUSE 
Ronald J. Bacigal" 
More so than any other provision of the Bill of Rights, the 
Fourth Amendment has always been a deadly serious gamble. 
How much of our collective security are we willing to risk in 
order to promote individual freedom? 1 
The framers of the amendment have given us one answer 
to this question2-intrusions upon liberty and privacy may 
take place when the government has probable cause that the 
search will uncover the sought-after goods or that the seized 
person committed a crime. Yet the Supreme Court has said 
very little about computing the odds-the degree of 
certainty-that determines when probable cause exists. The 
• Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. Funding for this 
work was underwritten by the National Center for Justice and the Rule of Law 
at the University of Mississippi School of Law, which is supported by a grant 
from the Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice 
Assistance. I thank my friends and colleagues, John Douglass and Corinna Lain, 
for their comments on an earlier draft, and for enduring my endless ruminations 
on this topic. 
1 In construing probable cause for seizure of a person, Gerstein u. Pugh, 420 
U.S. 103, 112 (1975) stated that this standard "represents a necessary 
accommodation between the individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to 
control crime." See also JACOB w. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE 
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 13 (The Johns 
Hopkins Univ. Studies in Historical and Political Sci., Series No. 84, 1966) (the 
issues raised under the Fourth Amendment "bring into sharp focus the classic 
dilemma of order versus liberty in the democratic state"). 
2 In addressing the conflict between enforcing the law in protection of the 
community, and protecting the community from unreasonable interferences with 
privacy, the Court has labeled probable cause as "the best compromise that has 
been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more 
would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-
abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). 
Probable cause, however, is but one form of justification for constitutional 
searches. See infra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's 
recognition of various forms of justification involving balancing and special needs). 
279 
280 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 74 
case law on probable cause harbors a central ambiguity 
because the Court has told us that probable cause lies 
between bare suspicion and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.3 
Within this sizable range, "[t]he emphasis is on calculating 
likelihoods. Whether this excludes all other factors and 
whether the likelihood must be 'more likely than not' are 
questions arguably unsettled.'14 
Just how unsettled these questions are can be 
demonstrated by considering two hypotheticals:5 
1. A small commuter plane takes off with two pilots, a 
flight attendant and ten passengers. When the attendant 
slips into the bathroom, a would-be hijacker locks her in and 
attempts to take over the plane. The attendant can discern 
the voices of five hijackers as they coordinate their attack on 
the cockpit. She then hears the voices of five passengers who 
rally to thwart the attempted hijacking. The stalemate ends 
when the pilot makes an emergency landing and the police 
take control of the plane. Predictably, the passengers split 
into two groups of five, each group claiming to be the heroic 
passengers while identifying the other group as the terrorists. 
The police thus face a situation where there is a 50/50 chance 
that each passenger is a terrorist. 
Do these facts constitute probable cause to detain, arrest or 
search each passenger? Is there probable cause to search each 
passenger's luggage, their autos parked at the airport and their 
residences? 
If the answers to the first hypothetical seem preordained 
3 Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175. "'The substance of all the definitions' of probable 
cause 'is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.' And this 'means less than 
evidence which would justify condemnation' or conviction . . . [but) more than 
bare suspicion." Id. (quoting McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881); Locke 
v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348 (1813)) (citations and footnote omitted). 
• Valente v. Wallace, 332 F.3d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 
• These hypotheticals were inspired by Professor Nesson's famous "prisoner" 
hypothetical where only one of twenty-five identically dressed prisoners refuses to 
participate in the killing of a guard. Because Professor Nesson gives us no way to 
distinguish among the prisoners, the odds as to any one prisoner are a 96% 
likelihood of guilt, and a 4% likelihood of innocence. Charles R. Nesson, 
Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. 
L. REV. 1187, 1192-93 (1979). 
2004) THE ODDS ON PROBABLE CAUSE 281 
in a post-September 11 world, are the answers altered in any 
way when the facts of the hypothetical are modified as follows: 
2. This time, when the attendant enters the bathroom, a 
defective latch temporarily locks her in. A nicotine deprived 
passenger seizes the opportunity to light a cigarette. The 
attendant can hear the voices of four other passengers who 
agree to share the cigarette. She also hears the protests of 
five passengers who object to the second-hand smoke. When 
the attendant frees herself and confronts the passengers, she 
is faced with two five person groups, each group claiming to 
be the non-smokers while identifying the others as the 
smokers. 
Again, is there probable cause to detain, arrest or search 
each passenger? Is there probable cause to search each 
passenger's luggage, their autos parked at the airport and their 
residences? 
This article seeks the answer to the hypotheticals in 
sources ranging from the judiciary's own pronouncements on 
probable cause to linguistics, history mathematics and 
cognitive psychology. 
A LINGUISTIC VIEW OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
If we begin at the beginning, we must give some attention 
to the common usage of the term "probable." "At first blush, the 
phrase [probable cause] seems to connote a standard akin to 
more than fifty percent,m; i.e., more likely than not that the 
search will turn up sought-after items or that the seized person 
is guilty of a crime. After all, if the weatherman says it's proba-
bly going to rain today, I assume he's talking about more than 
a 50% chance. But that assumption may not be universally 
shared. Webster's defines "probable" as meaning "supported by 
evidence strong enough to establish presumption but not 
proof."7 Putting a legal spin on the words "presumption" and 
"proof," provides some support for the "more likely than not 
6 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
757, 784 (1994). 
7 WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 916 ( 1973). 
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standard." Juries in civil cases are instructed that the party 
with the burden of proof must convince them by a preponder-
ance of evidence, i.e., more likely than not.8 Judges apply pre-
sumptions to establish a prima facia case, a degree of 
likelihood sufficient to decide the issue until rebutted. 
This slight linguistic support for equating "probable" with 
"more likely" is undercut, however, by the very same 
dictionary's alternative definition of "probable" as "likely to be 
or become true or real."9 The word "likely" is not modified by 
the term "more likely," or by mathematical likelihoods such as 
50%, 30%, and so on. About the only thing clear is that "likely 
to be or become true or real" sounds more certain than the 
dictionary's characterization of "possible," as "something that 
may or may not occur."10 Like the Supreme Court, semantic 
interpretation of the term "probable" seems comfortable only 
with placing the term somewhere between the range of a 1 % to 
100% likelihood. The lower end of this range is identified as 
"mere possibility" in the dictionary, and as "mere conjecture" in 
the Court's lexicon. The upper end of the range is referred to in 
the dictionaries as "presumption but not proof," while the Court 
prefers the terminology of "less than proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt." In short, the Court has its own preferred language, but 
has neither improved upon nor worsened the linguistic uncer-
tainty surrounding the term probable. 
Still lurking somewhere in that semantic tangle between 
1 % and 100% likelihood is the dividing line between probable 
and improbable. When the Court speaks of "fair probability,"11 
it implicitly recognizes that there must be a contrasting "unfair 
probability," often labeled mere speculation or conjecture. Spec-
8 A typical jury instruction in a civil action is: 
[I)t is proper to find that a party has succeeded in carrying the burden of 
proof on an issue of fact if, after consideration of all the evidence in the 
case, the jurors believe that what is sought to be proved on that issue is 
more likely true than not true. 
2 HON. EDWARD J. DEVITI & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND 
INSTRUCTIONS § 71.13 (3d ed. 1977). 
• WEBSTER'S, supra note 7, at 917. 
io Id. 
11 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
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ifying a standard of certainty for probable cause necessarily en-
tails drawing a dividing line on the spectrum of uncertainty. As 
is so often the case in life and the law, we are faced with draw-
ing a dividing line. To recognize this task is not to abandon 
hope because Justice Holmes assured us that the question of 
where to draw the line is "pretty much everything worth argu-
ing in the law. "12 
If linguists and Supreme Court Justices haven't pinned 
down this elusive creature called probable cause, perhaps our 
forefathers did the heavy lifting for us and settled upon a more 
precise definition of the term. At this point we can turn from 
the dictionaries to the history books in search of an answer. 
A HISTORICAL VIEW OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
"A natural starting point for those trying to solve the vari-
ous puzzles of the Fourth Amendment, including the meaning 
of probable cause, is in the English and American colonial 
past."13 Unfortunately, a number of recent scholarly examina-
tions of the Fourth Amendment in general, and probable cause 
in particular, have despaired of finding a definitive answer. 
Craig S. Lerner, in The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, con-
cludes that "the precise phrase [probable cause] appears to 
have been relatively uncommon in colonial practice,"14 and 
that when the phrase was used, "far from being a single stan-
dard, [probable cause] seems to have been a variable one, both 
across time and within a given time period."15 For example, 
within the seventeenth century Coke "argued that a warrant 
could issue only after an indictment and not upon what he 
termed 'bare surmise[,)' [but] [t]his view was forcefully and 
repeatedly criticized in the mid-seventeenth century by Mat-
thew Hale."16 
12 Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 168 (1925). 
13 Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
951, 972 (2003). 
1
• Id. at 979. 
15 Id. at 978. 
16 Id. at 974 (footnote omitted). 
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In The Birth of Probable Cause, 17 Jack K. Weber traces 
the earliest first-hand discussion of probable cause to Bracton's 
writings in the late thirteenth century, but concludes that 
"Bracton's concepts are bundled together in an imprecise way. 
There are no supporting cases and we cannot pin down from 
his generalizations the precise level of information needed in 
each instance."18 Rather than provide a precise definition of 
probable or adequate cause, Weber leaves us with a rather 
amorphous standard that he says represents the "horse sense 
of the ages," a theme that reappears in one of the current ap-
proaches to probable cause as a matter of "common sense."19 
From its origins until the enactment of the Fourth 
Amendment, probable cause seems to have remained in a state 
of flux. 20 The historian William Cuddihy has contrasted vari-
ous enactments of the First Congress of the United States 
which embraced differing thresholds for the issuance of search 
warrants.21 The Collection Act of 1789 created a low evidentia-
ry standard for the issuance of a warrant, removed altogether a 
magistrate's discretion to refuse a warrant, and largely insulat-
ed the officer from suit if the search failed to uncover evidence 
of crime.22 By contrast, The Excise Act of 1791 created a high-
er evidentiary burden, invested magistrates with the discretion 
to refuse warrants and was far more liberal in affording those 
searched with civil remedies.23 
In The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 24 David A. 
17 Jack K Weber, The Birth of Probable Cause, 11 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 155 
(1982). 
18 Id. at 161. 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 168-69. 
20 In 1766, George Mason protested against a British statute's use of the term 
"probable Cause of Complaint," because the word probable was "a word before an 
unknown in the Language and Style of Laws!" Lerner, supra note 13, at 979 
(quoting Letter from George Mason to the Committee of Merchants in London 
(June 6, 1766), in 1 PAPERS OF GEORGE MAsON 65, 67 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 
1970)). 
21 William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 
1550 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School). 
22 Cuddihy, supra note 21, at 1527. 
23 Id. at 1528, 1543. 
24 David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1739 (2000). 
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Sklansky issues a broad challenge to the Court's new found 
emphasis on common law history and its failure to recognize 
that common law rules of search and seizure were both hazier 
and less comprehensive than the Court has suggested. Profes-
sor Sklansky is particularly critical of 
how Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas speak in their recent 
Fourth Amendment opinions. To find the rule 'at common law' 
they look sometimes to cases, sometimes to statutes, some-
times to commentaries. They refer interchangeably to authori-
ties from the 1600s and 1700s-and sometimes also from the 
1800s and early 1900s. They mix together English and Ameri-
can materials. 25 
Professor Sklansky maintains that even if there were an 
accepted common law definition of probable cause, and it ap-
pears there was not, most of those who ratified the Constitu-
tion and adopted the Bill of Rights were not lawyers, and they 
would have been unlikely to view probable cause as a term of 
art. In fact there is little evidence that most of them had mas-
tered the common-law rules of search and seizure, let alone 
endorsed them. 
[D)uring the debates ... over ratification of the proposed Con-
stitution, those concerned about the search-and-seizure pow-
ers of the federal government consistently called for an 
amendment restraining those powers ''within proper bounds," 
or forbidding "all unreasonable searches and seizures." No one 
proposed a constitutional ban on searches and seizures "con-
trary to common law," or "currently illegal under state 
law."26 
These recent historical inquiries suggest that the first 
failing of Fourth Amendment history is its inability to provide 
a clear meaning for the term probable cause. But an even more 
serious shortcoming of this type of historical inquiry is the 
realization that even if we could learn with certainty what the 
common law meant, there remains the fundamental ques-
25 Id. at 1795. 
26 Id. at 1792 (footnote omitted). 
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tion-"So what?" Prior to Justice Scalia's "originalist" approach 
to the Fourth Amendment, the Court had informed us that 
(t]he common-law rules governing searches and arrests 
evolved in a society far simpler than ours is today. Crime has 
changed, as have the means of law enforcement, and it would 
therefore be naive to assume that those actions a constable 
could take in an English or American village three centuries 
ago should necessarily govern what we, as a society, now 
regard as proper. 27 
A reluctance to adopt common law history as the sine qua 
non of Fourth Amendment interpretation appears frequently in 
Supreme Court cases decided in the 1980s. For example, in 
Tennessee u. Garner,28 the Court acknowledged that it "has not 
simply frozen into constitutional law those law enforcement 
practices that existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment's 
passage."29 The Garner Court found the use of deadly force to 
stop all fleeing felons "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amend-
ment, despite common-law approval of the practice.30 The old 
rule, the Court concluded, no longer made sense. In the past 
decade or so, however, Justice Scalia has replaced the Court's 
hesitance to follow common law precedent with a strict 
"originalist" approach to constitutional interpretation. His ap-
proach maintains that "the principal criterion for assessing 
whether searches and seizures are 'unreasonable' within the 
meaning of the Constitution is whether they were allowed by 
eighteenth-century common law."31 "This new form of Fourth 
27 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 217 n.10 (1981). "The Bureau of 
Justice note[d) that as of 1996, there were more than 700,000 police officers in 
the United States, which is roughly one police officer for every 400 citizens." 
Lerner, supra note 13, at 1019 n.452 (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, Census 
of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies 1996 (1998)). In contrast, in 1811 
there was one constable in England for every 18,187 persons. Jerome Hall, Legal 
and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REV. 566, 582 
(1936). 
28 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
29 Garner, 471 U.S. at 13 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 
n.33 (1980)). 
30 Id. at 14. 
31 Sklansky, supra note 24, at 1739. 
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Amendment originalism breaks dramatically . . . with the 
ahistoric approach of the Warren and Burger Courts . . . [and] 
with an older tradition of using the background of the Fourth 
Amendment to illuminate not its precise demands but its gen-
eral aims. "32 
Judge Richard Posner has been particularly critical of this 
"originalist" approach, suggesting that it is a sham, with a 
"judge ... do[ing] the wildest things, all the while presenting 
himself as the passive agent of the sainted Founders-don't 
argue with me, argue with Them."33 Whether or not one 
agrees with Judge Posner's criticism, the Court has demon-
strated an uncanny ability to simultaneously select and ignore 
relevant common law precedent. For example, in California v. 
Hodari D.,34 the majority adopted the common law definition 
of a seizure of a person as requiring either an actual touching 
or a submission to a show of authority.35 Thus, an escaping 
suspect is not seized so long as he continues to flee. The dis-
sent, however, urged the Court to look "not to the common law 
of arrest, but to the common law of attempted arrest."36 Al-
though a common law arrest required either touching or sub-
mission, the common law also recognized that "an officer might 
be guilty of an assault because of an attempted arrest, without 
privilege, even if he did not succeed in touching the other."37 
The majority countered, however, that "neither usage nor com-
mon-law tradition makes an attempted seizure a seizure. The 
common law may have made an attempted seizure unlawful in 
certain circumstances; but it made many things unlawful, very 
few of which were elevated to constitutional proscriptions. "38 
32 Id. 
33 RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 251 (1995). Professor Tribe also cau-
tioned against using the passive voice which "makes it look as though someone 
out there, unspecified, is doing it to us. Admit that it's we who are doing it." 
Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a 
Pseudo-scientific Sieve, 36 HAsTINGS L.J. 155, 170 (1984). 
34 499 U.S. 621 (1991). 
35 Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628. 
36 Id. at 632 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
37 Rollins M. Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REV. 201 (1990) (citing 
Gold u. Bissell, 1 Wend. 210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828). 
38 Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 n.2. 
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The Hodari D. majority did not explain why it had selec-
tively incorporated common law arrests into Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, while refusing to assimilate common law 
concepts of attempted arrests.39 Recognition of a common law 
arrest as "the quintessential 'seizure of the person' under our 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudencen4° does not mean that the 
Court must banish common law prohibitions of attempted ar-
rests to the trash bin of peculiar historical practices that can-
not be "elevated to constitutional proscriptions."41 After all, 
intrusion into residential dwellings is the prototypical search 
specified in the Constitution,42 but the Court has extended 
Fourth Amendment coverage to commercial premises,43 auto-
mobiles,44 and quasi-public areas like telephone booths.45 
In the final analysis Fourth Amendment history appears to 
fail us on two counts. First, it does not provide a clear, precise 
or even commonly accepted definition of probable cause. 46 Sec-
ond, the common law's judgments about search and seizure are 
necessarily time-bound by the era in which they arose. They 
may provide limited guidance, but they are not dispositive of 
modern day search and seizure issues. 
[W]e make a serious mistake to accept the belief that the past 
39 
The Court has adopted an abridged version of the Amendment's histo-
ry . . . . This truncated view of history simply does not reflect the 
Framer's thoughts about the Fourth Amendment's constitutional meaning. 
In sum, the Court has ignored the complexity of the Fourth Amendment's 
origins, and as a result has denied itself and the nation the potential 
benefits of a comprehensive historical inquiry. 
Tracy Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth 
Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 973 (2002). 
'
0 Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624. 
41 Id. at 626 n.2. 
" See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1980). 
43 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967). 
« California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 0985). 
46 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
•• Even Justices Scalia and Thomas may be abandoning their focus on history 
and common law. See Groh v. Ramirez, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1298 (2004) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (stating "it is possible that neither the history of the Fourth Amend-
ment nor the common law provides much guidance" in discussing the relationship 
between the Amendment's two clauses). 
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has done its work for the present, and that our liberty, which 
is the cornerstone of democracy, is guaranteed. The truth is 
that one generation can never protect the rights of another, 
and although all of our great documents: the Declaration of 
Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, are 
ideal reflections of our finest aspirations, they are not self-ful-
filling chariots of justice. For all their beauty, they are only 
words, dependent on each generation to give them a meaning 
and content for its own time and place. 47 
JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF PROBABLE CAUSE-PIGEONHOLING 
WITHOUT CROSS-REFERENCING 
"'The substance of all the definitions' of probable cause 'is a 
reasonable ground for belief of guilt."148 In Texas v. Brown,49 a 
four person plurality declared that this reasonable belief need 
not be "correct or more likely true than false. A 'practical, 
nontechnical' probability that incriminating evidence is in-
volved is all that is required."50 A majority of the Court has 
never explicitly held that probable cause is less than a prepon-
derance of the evidence, and the Court has been inconsistent in 
the few decisions where it has addressed the burdens of proof 
that apply to various Fourth Amendment issues. The prime 
example of this troubling approach is Maryland v. Buie,51 
where the Court managed to be both opaque and inconsistent. 
When discussing the Fourth Amendment standard of proof 
that applies to a protective sweep of the defendant's premises, 
the only clear aspect of Buie was the Court's rejection of "an 
unnecessarily strict Fourth Amendment standard" requiring "a 
protective sweep to be justified by probable cause to believe 
that a serious and demonstrable potentiality for danger existed 
"
52 It is difficult, however, to decipher the following pas-
47 Sol Wachtler, Our Constitutions-Alive and Well, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 
381, 387 (1987). 
•• Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (emphasis added) (quot-
ing McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881)). 
•• 460 U.S. 730 (1983). 
•• Brown, 460 U.S. at 742. 
•
1 494 U.S. 325 (1990) 
•• Buie, 494 U.S. at 336-37. 
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sage in which the Court formulates the correct standard to be 
applied: 
The type of search we authorize today ... may be conducted 
only when justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
the house is harboring a person posing a danger to those on 
the arrest scene. . . . 
. . . The Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited 
protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when 
the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on 
specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept har-
bors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest 
scene.53 
Within a couple of sentences, the Court referred to the 
standard of proof as both reasonable suspicion and reasonable 
belief. One of the few areas of clarity involving probable cause 
is the Court's recognition of a hierarchy of certainty, i.e., proba-
ble cause requires a greater degree of likelihood than does 
suspicion. The clarity arises primarily from logic and linguis-
tics, not from the Court's sometimes cavalier use of the terms 
belief and suspicion. As a logical matter, any distinction be-
tween reasonable suspicion and reasonable belief must rest on 
the meaning of the words suspicion and belief, not on the 
meaning of the identical modifier-reasonable. Common usage 
of the terms belief and suspicion also accords with the Court's 
placement of these terms within a scale of certainty. For exam-
ple, Webster's defines "believe" as having "a firm conviction" or 
"to consider to be true,"54 while suspicion involves merely 
"slight evidence" or "uncertainty."55 When the Court uses the 
terms suspicion and belief in a consistent manner, we have the 
tools for distinguishing two constitutional levels of certainty. 56 
In contrast, when the Court states that searches, seizures and 
53 Id. at 337 {emphasis added). 
°' WEBSTER'S, supra note 7, at 101. 
65 Id. at 1174. 
66 In most contexts, the court uses the term probable cause "to refer to a 
quantum of evidence for the belief justifying the search, to be distinguished from 
a lesser quantum such as 'reasonable suspicion."' Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 
868, 877 n.4 (1987). 
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temporary detention must all be based on "reasonable 
grounds," any distinction between degrees of likelihood is lost 
in a muddled consideration of the "totality of the circumstanc-
es." 
The useful distinction between belief and suspicion was 
emphasized in Richards u. Wisconsin,57 in the discussion of 
the justification required for "no-knock" entry.58 The Court 
held in Richards that the police must have a reasonable suspi-
cion that knocking and announcing their presence would be 
dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective inves-
tigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction 
of evidence.59 The Court explained that its choice of the stan-
dard of reasonable suspicion "--as opposed to a probable-cause 
requirement-strikes the appropriate balance between the legit-
imate law enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of 
search warrants and the individual privacy interests affected 
by no-knock entries."60 Richards is one of the few cases in 
which the Court effectively cross-referenced and contrasted the 
levels of certainty required by suspicion and belief (probable 
cause). Buie, on the other hand, blurred the distinction by in-
terchanging the terms reasonable suspicion and reasonable 
belief. Whether that blurring rests upon a slip of the pen, or 
the Court's failure to adhere to its prior distinction between 
suspicion and belief, we can register our legitimate concern 
over the Court's lack of precision when discussing the level of 
certainty required by the Fourth Amendment. 
The Court's tendency to pigeonhole, but not cross-refer-
ence, degrees of certainties is also reflected in its discussion of 
the inevitable discovery doctrine. The question of whether ille-
gally seized evidence likely would (inevitably) have been dis-
covered by lawful means is akin to the nature of probable 
cause, i.e. whether evidence to be seized likely will be discov-
ered by a lawful search. Despite the ambiguity surrounding the 
67 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997). 
68 Richards, 520 U.S. at 394. 
s• Id. 
60 Id. (emphasis added). 
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forward looking nature of probable cause,61 Nix v. Williams62 
was clear with respect to the backward-looking nature of the 
inevitable discovery doctrine.63 Nix required the government 
to meet the more-likely-than-not standard in order to avail 
itself of the inevitable discovery doctrine.64 In fact the only 
debate in Nix was whether to adopt the preponderance stan-
dard or the higher standard of "clear and convincing evidence." 
The Nix dissent argued for the clear and convincing evidence 
standard because "[i]ncreasing the burden of proof serves to 
impress the factfinder with the importance of the decision and 
thereby reduces the risk that illegally obtained evidence will be 
admitted."65 
If the risk that unjustified searches and seizures will occur 
is substituted for the risk of admitting illegally obtained evi-
dence, the Nix dissent's argument for a high standard of proof 
could be transposed to the probable cause requirement. After 
all, a higher standard of certainty would seem most needed 
when authorizing future searches that may well impact on 
innocent people.66 In contrast, Nix involved a situation where 
the past search produced clear evidence of the defendant's 
guilt.67 The higher standard adopted in Nix is particularly sur-
61 The Court has stated: 
[T)he protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments "can only be 
realized if the police are acting under a set of rules which, in most in-
stances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as 
to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law en-
forcement." 
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-
By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 
1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 142). 
62 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
63 Nix, 467 U.S. at 431 (addressing a violation of the Sixth Amendment). 
64 Id. at 444. Evidence will not be excluded "[i)f the prosecution can establish 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably 
would have been discovered by lawful means . . . . " Id. 
65 Id. at 459-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
66 See generally, Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Deuice for 
Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (1983). 
67 Nix, 467 U.S. at 434-35. Protection of the innocent against unreasonable 
searches and seizures would be largely a prospective matter, because, as a practi-
cal matter, the trial court will be determining probable cause in a suppression 
hearing where the seized evidence is likely to be damning. The higher standard 
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prising in light of the Court's expressed hostility to the truth 
defeating nature of the exclusionary rule.68 Had the Court 
thought to compare the levels of certainty required for probable 
cause and for "inevitable discovery," it might have been sur-
prised at what it had wrought. If, however, the Court sees a 
symmetry in the standards of certainty it requires from the 
government, we would all benefit from an articulation of that 
symmetry. To date, the Court has not only failed to define the 
level of certainty that constitutes probable cause, the Court has 
failed to explain the underlying principle governing its choice 
among standards such as suspicion, belief, preponderance, and 
clear and convincing.69 
A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH TO PROBABLE CAUSE 
In Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal 
Process, Professor Laurence H. Tribe gave us one view of the 
evolutionary role mathematics has played in the legal system: 
The system of legal proof that replaced trial by battle in 
Continental Europe during the Middle Ages reflected a stark-
ly numerical jurisprudence. The law typically specified how 
many uncontradicted witnesses were required to establish 
in Nix is aimed, in part, to protect against the attractiveness of 20-20 hindsight 
(e.g., "of course our police department is competent and would have found the 
evidence"). A court's determination of probable cause is likely to be influenced by 
hindsight in a similar way, and thus requires similar protection by a similar 
standard of proof. 
68 As Professor Akil Amar suggested: 
[S)hould not the law strongly presume that somehow, some way, some-
time, the truth would come out? Criminals get careless or cocky; conspira-
tors rat; neighbors come forward; cops get lucky; the truth outs; and 
justice reigns--<>r so our courts should presume, and any party seeking to 
suppress truth and thwart justice should bear a heavy burden of proof. 
Amar, supra note 6, at 794. 
69 The Court has also used the phrase "reasonable probability" when determin-
ing violations of constitutional discovery rights. In that context, the Court has 
stated that a material violation "does not require demonstration by a preponder-
ance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted unlimitedly 
in the defendant's acquittal . . . . A 'reasonable probability' of a different result is 
accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression 'undermines 
confidence in the outcome of the trial.'" Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 
(1995) (citations omitted). 
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various categories of propositions, and defined precisely how 
many witnesses of a particular class or gender were needed to 
cancel the testimony of a single witness of a more elevated 
order. So it was that medieval law, nurtured by the abstrac-
tions of scholasticism, sought in mathematical precision an 
escape from the perils of irrational and subjective judgment. 
In a more pragmatic era, it should come as no surprise 
that the search for objectivity in adjudication has taken an-
other tack. Yesterday's practice of numerology has given way 
to today's theory of probability, currently the sine qua non of 
rational analysis. 70 
The continuing development of modern science has fostered 
a desire to quantify legal doctrines such as probable cause. Soft 
facts and "mushy" legal concepts increasingly are seen as infe-
rior to hard facts and objective analysis, and concrete statistical 
infer'ence is to be preferred to intuitive judgment. Thus, some 
urge that law in general and probable cause in particular 
should be made amenable to mathematical formulation. 71 
The judiciary, however, has cautioned against being se-
duced by the allure of objectivity and precision in mathematics. 
"Mathematics, a veritable sorcerer in our computerized society, 
while assisting the trier of fact in the search for truth, must 
not cast a spell over him. "72 In its most comprehensive discus-
sion of probable cause, the Supreme Court stated that "an 
effort to fix some general, numerically precise degree of certain-
ty corresponding to 'probable cause' may not be helpful .... "73 
Instead, probable cause remains "a fluid concept ... not readi-
ly, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set oflegal rules."74 
If we seek to find the appropriate middle ground between 
being the master or slave of mathematical precision, we must 
70 Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal 
Process, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1329, 1329 (1971) (footnote omitted) 
71 
"[T)he question inevitably arises in any discussion of probable cause: just 
how probable? There is the vague impression that, if law were truly a serious 
enterprise, the answer would be amenable to mathematical form." Lerner, supra 
note 13, at 995. 
72 People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 33 (Cal. 1968). 
73 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983). 
74 Gates, 462 U.S. at 232. 
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consider three questions: (1) Should mathematical probabilities 
be used as evidence to meet the standard of probable cause, at 
whatever level of certainty the standard is set? (2) To what 
extent should mathematical probabilities replace or compliment 
intuitive appraisals? (3) Should probable cause be expressed as 
a mathematical likelihood? 
USE OF STATISTICAL EVIDENCE 
All proof is ultimately "probabilistic" in the sense that no 
conclusion can ever be drawn from empirical data without some 
step of inductive inference. The question is whether to bring 
this probabilistic element of inference to explicit attention in a 
quantified way, i.e., in overtly probabilistic evidence. 
Perhaps the most common type of overtly probabilistic 
evidence involves base rates which are defined as the relative 
frequency with which an event occurs or an attribute is pres-
ent in a population. The base rate for an event or attribute 
equals the probability that it will be present in any randomly 
selected member of the reference class prior to the introduc-
tion of case-specific or individuating information. 75 
For example, in the airplane hypotheticals at the start of this 
article, the base rate is a 50% probability that any particular 
passenger is guilty. The question of probable cause might be 
resolved at this point purely on the basis of probability theo-
ry-a legal determination that a 50% likelihood constitutes 
adequate probable cause to arrest and search. Yet the law 
seems uncomfortable with relying wholly on base rates and 
making the leap from aggregate likelihood to a conclusion of 
probable cause in a specific case.76 "Background evidence is 
75 Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing 
Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 
75 CORNELL L. REV. 247, 252 (1990). 
76 In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 943 (1984), Justice Brennan cau-
tioned that "personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages." See also 
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2164 
(2002) ("Current Fourth Amendment law discourages group seizures. . . . Aggre-
gate justifications-no one person is reasonably suspected, but the odds are high 
that some members of the group are criminal~o not suffice."). 
296 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 74 
considered somehow inferior to evidence that is individuating 
and specific to the case at hand."77 
In our hijacking hypothetical, non-mathematically based 
probable cause might be satisfied by case-specific evidence like 
the flight attendant's claim that she could recognize all ten 
voices she heard on the plane. After some minimal assurances 
that she was reasonably confident of her ability, the police 
might utilize her voice identifications to sort the ten suspects 
into the likely guilty and the likely innocent. Suppose, however, 
that the police disdained case-specific facts and used additional 
statistics to sort the suspects according to who most closely 
matched a profile of hijackers. In a crude example, the police 
cite a study establishing that people from Middle-Eastern coun-
tries are ten percent more likely than the general population to 
hijack a plane. Should the law of probable cause distinguish 
between the overtly probabilistic hijacker profile and the case-
specific voice identifications made by the flight attendant? Why 
should there even be a question of discounting the starkly nu-
merical likelihood reflected in the profile, when no one ques-
tions establishing probable cause based upon circumstantial 
evidence or statements from witnesses or informants of doubt-
ful credibility?78 
One objection to relying on statistical likelihoods is that 
arresting or searching based solely on a bare probability (i.e., 
favorable ''betting odds") wrongfully "gambles" with a citizen's 
liberty or privacy. Thus, the argument goes, law enforcement 
authorities should be barred from searching or seizing on the 
basis of bare statistics. 79 This claim ignores the reality that a 
similar gamble exists whenever there is any doubt about the 
defendant's guilt, regardless of whether the doubt arises from 
statistics or case-specific evidence. After all, how sure is the 
77 Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 75, at 262. 
78 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Spinelli v. United States, 378 
U.S. 410 (1969). 
79 The "[a)uthority of police officers to spy on occupants of toilet 
booths-whether in an amusement park or a private home-will not be sustained 
on the theory that if they watch enough people long enough some malum prohi-
bitum acts will eventually be discovered." State v. Bryant, 177 N.W.2d 800, 801 
(Minn. 1970) 
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flight attendant that she can distinguish ten voices, and how 
sure are we of her professed ability to make such distinc-
tions?80 All evidence is probabilistic, requires inferences to 
support an ultimate conclusion, and thus involves a risk of er-
ror. Statistical evidence is different only in that it makes these 
uncertainties explicit. Society cannot avoid "gambling" with 
citizens' liberties unless one hundred percent certainty becomes 
the prerequisite to arrests and searches. Any aversion to gam-
bling with a defendant's liberty and privacy suggests raising 
the burden of proof for all cases. "It does not support a special 
rule for statistical-probability cases."81 
A second objection to relying on statistical likelihoods is 
that arresting or searching based wholly on a bare statistical 
probability violates the principle that citizens should be treated 
as unique individuals.82 The profiling evidence in the hijacking 
hypothetical focuses not on a suspect's own attributes, but on 
background information that describes the statistical attributes 
of a broader class of individuals, i.e., residents of Middle-East-
ern countries. An unavoidable feature of probabilistic thinking 
is that it treats people as members of a group rather than as 
individuals. Some commentators suggest that this focus vio-
lates an ethical command to treat citizens as unique individu-
als and to judge them only on evidence about their own conduct 
or matters within their own control.83 We should, the argu-
80 The flight attendant may have first-order uncertainty, e.g., she may be 60% 
sure of her identification of any voice. The police, however, may have a second-
order uncertainty if they are only 50% confident of her ability to distinguish 
among the voices. Empirical studies suggest that people making judgments and 
decisions generally take both first-order and second-order uncertainty into account. 
Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 75, at 251. 
81 Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Jus-
tice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 530, 538 (1989). 
82 Some fear that using numerical terms leads to "the dehumanization of the 
legal process." Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure's Magical Number Three: Psychologi-
cal Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1147 (1987). 
83 One commentator has stated that 
the Fourth Amendment is the commitment to treating persons who come 
before the law on the basis of their individual, particular, uncommon, and 
odd property and attributes. Juristic procedures which help show the 
unique characteristics of individuals and actions to the decision-maker 
provide the factual evidentiary base for legal judgments which avoid ab-
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ment goes, apply to the search and seizure phase the instinc-
tive reluctance to convict and punish a person based on statisti-
cal evidence that the defendant is one among many, or even a 
few, who could have committed the crime.84 
Of course we all know that innocent people are sometimes 
convicted by an imperfect criminal justice system. But deliber-
ately sacrificing an innocent person, by say, convicting all ten 
passengers on our hypothetical airplane, seems worse than 
simply acknowledging a long-run statistical chance of unjust 
convictions. As an analogy, consider the difference between a 
suicide bomber and a volunteer for a suicide mission where 
death is highly likely, but not certain. Western society views 
the latter as an act of heroism, while generally condemning the 
former. Yet, however much society seeks to prevent the ulti~ 
mate conviction and punishment of the innocent, the concept of 
probable cause accepts that some innocent people will be re-
quired to surrender their liberty or privacy at the early investi-
gative stages of search and seizure.85 
Once we acknowledge that innocents may be searched and 
seized, any differentiation between "individualized" case-specif-
ic evidence and "statistical" evidence is largely illusionary. For 
example, what was suspicious about the conduct observed in 
stract moral structures and remain useful as explanations of external 
phenomena. 
Gary A. Ahrens, Privacy and Property: Can They Remain After Juridical Person-
ality ls Lost?, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1077, 1082 (1977) (footnote omitted). 
The law's respect for autonomy counsels focusing on factors that can be con-
trolled by the suspect whose liberty and privacy are to be set aside. "The citizen 
who has given no good cause for believing he is engaged in [transportation of con-
traband) is entitled to proceed on his way without interference." Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 177 (1949). 
84 This instinctive reluctance was the focus of Professor Nesson's prisoner 
hypothetical. See supra note 5. "Group guilt can be both immensely powerful and 
deeply troubling when used to punish people or focus suspicion on them merely 
for their associations . . . . " David A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity as a Factor 
in Assessing the Reasonableness of Fourth Amendment Activity: Description, Yes; 
Prediction, No, 73 MISS. L.J. 423, 451 (2003) (emphasis added). 
•• Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), "accepts the risk that officers may stop 
innocent people. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment accepts that risk in connection 
with more drastic police action; persons arrested and detained on probable cause 
to believe they have committed a crime may turn out to be innocent." Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000). 
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Terry v. Ohio, where Officer McFadden observed two men take 
turns walking down the street to stare into a window twenty-
four times, conferring with each other after each trip.86 Pre-
swnably Officer McFadden's past experience provided him with 
a generalized view of how innocent shoppers act. The suspects 
observed by Officer McFadden did not fit this unscientific pro-
file of an innocent shopper. The point was well illustrated in 
the following hypothetical: 
Assume that the Cleveland Police Chief asked Officer 
McFadden and other similarly experienced officers to address 
a class of new recruits at the police academy on the topic, 
"What to Look for in Preventing Burglaries." Could a recruit 
take notes at this lecture and then rely on the experience of 
Officer McFadden and Officer McFadden's colleagues to justi-
fy the recruit's own reasonable suspicion in making future 
stops?87 
If the answer to the question is yes, it is difficult to conclude 
that hijacker profiles cannot be used because they are not indi-
vidualized. "[T]he suspicion underlying the detention of a per-
son believed to be a potential criminal is often based on police 
experience with previous crimes under similar circumstanc-
es .... "88 Thus, like other decision-makers, police inevitably 
act on stereotypes derived from their experience. 
The explicit use of profiles or other statistical compilations 
in searches and seizures mirrors the type of probabilistic 
thinking that increasingly appears in many areas of the law. 
For example, sentencing guidelines and "three strikes and 
you're out" laws treat offenders as members of a group rather 
than as unique individuals. Thus, all offenders with three req-
uisite convictions who are sentenced on a new offense are con-
sidered to pose a similar risk of recidivism and to warrant 
similar sentences. Such an assessment ignores, or gives little 
weight to, a particular offender's individuality. Instead, the 
86 Terry, 392 U.S. at 5. 
87 JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIETY SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 225 (1985). 
88 Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 U.C.L.A 
L. REV. 1, 83 (1991). 
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three-time offender is judged, as would be a person matching a 
profile, on the behavior of others in his group.89 Although 
"three strikes" laws are relatively recent developments, Profes-
sor Morgan Cloud has examined some largely ignored historical 
practices that led him to conclude that "the Founders of our 
constitutional scheme accepted some seizures based upon group 
identity as necessary responses to national crises. n9o 
Those who criticize sentencing guidelines, profiles and 
other stereotyping, seem to take as a given that stereotyping 
always works to the detriment of the individual, whereas 
treating people as individuals always works to the benefit of 
the individual.91 Yet, one might wonder whether persons who 
lost their liberty or privacy because of the exclusion of statisti-
cal evidence would derive much solace from being "treated as a 
unique human being." In our hijacking hypothetical, suppose 
the same profile that attributed a ten percent likelihood of guilt 
to suspects from Arab countries, indicated that there was a 
ninety-nine percent likelihood that citizens of Iceland would 
not hijack a plane. If the police treat Arabs and Icelanders 
alike, will the Icelander applaud such equality, or claim reverse 
discrimination favoring Arabs in spite of the Icelander's empiri-
cally superior score on the hijacker profile? 
When statistical studies uncover disproportionate offending 
rates among a distinct group, simple efficiency [not racial or 
ethnic prejudice] points toward devoting greater law enforce-
ment resources to this disproportionate group.92 Efficiency 
89 See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne'er-Do- Well to the Criminal 
History Category: The Refinement of the Actuarial Model in Criminal Law, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 99 (2003). 
90 Morgan Cloud, Quakers, Slaves and the Founders: Profiling to Saue the Un-
ion, 73 MISS. L.J. 369, 418 (2003). 
91 But see William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 
2137, 2169 (2002) ("Some marginal substitution of group searches for individual 
ones is very likely to raise the quality of police treatment of suspects even as it 
raises the ability of the political process (instead of the courts) to regulate po-
licing. These are real social gains."). 
92 
"All nineteen of the suicide hijackers of September 11 were from one nar-
row demographic group: they were young Muslim men from the Arab world. How 
could it not make sense to target our enforcement efforts at these same people?" 
Harris, supra note 84, at 426-27 (2003). Professor Harris ultimately concluded 
that racial profiling "is a legal, moral and practical dead end." Id. at 428. 
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considerations become particularly relevant if hijacker profiles 
and other screening measures are seen as promoting deter-
rence, 93 not just apprehension of the guilty. In particular, 
viewing the war on terrorism as a preemptive rather than 
reactionary endeavor suggests that profiles and screening mea-
sures may be the best way of insuring that terrorism never suc-
ceeds. The specter of hijacker profiles and airport screening is 
more likely to deter would-be-terrorists than is the fear that 
they will be betrayed by case-specific facts such as someone 
spotting a bomb fuse protruding from their tennis shoes.94 
There are of course many valid objections to profiling,95 
but these objections involve policy considerations independent 
of the empirical validity of the profiles.96 Although the law 
generally seeks to maximize factual accuracy, criteria other 
than error minimization also must be considered. The rules of 
evidence governing logical and legal relevance are particularly 
instructive in this regard. At trial, a fact-finder motivated sole-
ly by the interest in factual accuracy considers all logically 
probative evidence.97 Similarly, if the only function of probable 
cause is to ensure an accurate factual determination, then 
93 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552, 557 (1976) (stat-
ing an individualized suspicion requirement at roadblocks "would largely eliminate 
any deterrent to the conduct of well-disguised smuggling operations, even though 
smugglers are known to use these highways regularly"). 
•• When the goal is deterrence, insistence on case-specific facts becomes prob-
lematic because the goal is to prevent such facts from developing, i.e., to prevent 
potential threats at an early stage before they become mass disasters. If the gov-
ernment must wait until sufficient case-specific facts develop, its goal of deter-
rence has been frustrated. 
95 See generally Symposium, The Permissibility of Race or Ethnicity as a Fac-
tor in Assessing the Reasonableness of a Search or Seizure, 73 MISS. L.J. 365 
(2003). 
96 Racial profiling is a repugnant practice "not because it is irrational (in the 
sense of statistically inaccurate) but because it flouts the moral principle that it 
is wrong to judge an individual using the statistics of a racial or ethnic group. 
The argument against bigotry, . . . [is) a rule of ethics, that tells us when to 
tum our statistical categorizers off." STEVEN PINKER, How THE MIND WORKS 313 
(1997). 
97 
"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 
401. 
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scientifically valid profiles cannot be discounted.98 Legal rele-
vance, however, introduces the type of extraneous policy consid-
erations that may counterbalance the interest in logical valid-
ity,99 and Courts are often called upon to exclude probative 
evidence in order to serve important social goals. Within the 
context of the Fourth Amendment, we need look no further 
than its exclusionary rule, which excludes probative evidence 
and thus, presumably reduces factual accuracy. Application of 
the exclusionary rule recognizes that, at times, the quest for 
factual accuracy must be subordinated to the policy interest in 
deterring violations of the right to be free of unreasonable 
searches and seizure. Similarly, when assessing the use of 
profiles, it is valid to ask whether their logical relevance is out-
weighed by the social costs of permitting police to target people 
based on factors such as race or ethnic origin. 100 However, 
any reluctance to permit police to engage in profiling should 
not be based on a blanket rejection of the factual reliability or 
social costs of all profiles. Surely, with all the various profiles 
that abound,101 some are scientifically valid while others are 
98 J.C. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 
14 VAND. L. REV. 807, 817 (1961) (stating the proper standard of proof is the one 
that causes the smallest number of mistakes); David Kaye, The Laws of Proba-
bility and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 34, 35-36 (1979) (noting the 
only question in deciding whether to apply probability theory to legal fact-finding 
is "whether the technique would reduce the number of errors in the fact fmding"). 
99 
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or need-
less presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. Evm. 403. 
100 Courts have differed as to whether race or ethnicity can be considered as 
at least one piece of evidence establishing probable cause. Compare United States 
v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 n.2 (8th Cir. 1992) ("As it is, ... facts are not to 
be ignored simply because they are unpleasant-and the unpleasant fact in this 
case is that [the police officer] had knowledge ... that young ... black Los 
Angeles gangs were flooding the Kansas City area with cocaine."), with United 
States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The likelihood 
that in an area in which the majority-<>r even a substantial part-of the popula-
tion is Hispanic, any given person of Hispanic ancestry is in fact an alien, let 
alone an illegal alien, is not high enough to make Hispanic appearance a relevant 
factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus."). 
101 Just a few of the currently used profiles include: airline highjackers, drug-
couriers, alien smugglers, battering parents, serial killers, and those who make 
school-shooting threats. 
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not;102 some create social costs that outweigh their benefits, 
while others do not.103 
In summary, when the police in our hijacking hypothetical 
seek to supplement their information by consulting a hijacker 
profile, two separate objections may be raised. First, is the 
profile empirically valid, and second, do the efficiency gains 
from profiling outweigh the impact that this type of post-Sep-
tember policing imposes on people of Middle-Eastern origin? As 
to the first consideration, statistical probability evidence, "while 
neither a panacea nor devoid of problems, is relevant to the 
truth of asserted facts, and indeed is no less relevant in 
principle than case-specific evidence."104 A fifty percent proba-
bility of guilt based entirely on statistical information carries 
with it the same chance of inaccuracy as a fifty percent proba-
bility of guilt based on, say, the ability of a flight attendant to 
recognize and distinguish ten voices. All evidence contains a 
risk of error; overtly probabilistic evidence simply makes the 
risk more visible. Thus, a decision to rely on the flight 
attendant's ability to distinguish voices is no more or less spec-
ulative than deciding whether to rely on statistics. The differ-
ence between unacceptable speculation and reasonable infer-
ence is not a logical distinction, but a legal judgment. Specula-
tion describes a category of doubts that fail to establish proba-
ble cause, while reasonable inference describes a category of 
doubts acceptable within the concept of probable cause. 105 
102 For instance, according to one study conducted by the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, between forty and fifty percent of those identified as drug couri-
ers pursuant to a profile turned out to be carrying either illegal drugs or other 
evidence connecting them with the illegal drug trade. See MONAHAN & WALKER, 
supra note 87, at 226-27 (citing ZEDLEWSKI, THE DEA AIRPORT SURVEILLANCE 
PROGRAM: AN ANALYSIS OF AGENT ACTIVITIES (1984)). Compare Justice Marshall's 
criticism of the drug courier profile used in United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 
13(1989) (Marshall J., dissenting). 
103 
"Reasonable people can differ about the balance, but one could plausibly 
conclude that the efficiency gains from profiling outweigh the harm" of race-con-
scious policing. See Stuntz, supra note 91, at 2179. 
104 Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 75, at 278. 
105 
"Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing 
their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes 
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts 
leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability." Brinegar v. United States, 
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As to the second consideration regarding the social costs of 
profiling, the law has never permitted the quest for factual 
accuracy to trump all other values; thus, both case-specific and 
statistical evidence may be excluded for policy reasons. For 
example, in Winston v. Lee,106 the Court observed that "[a] 
compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for evi-
dence . . . implicates expectations of privacy and security of 
such magnitude that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even 
if likely to produce evidence of a crime."107 All other policy 
values being equal, however, there is no reason to favor case-
specific facts over statistical evidence such as profiles. Correctly 
applied, mathematical expressions of probabilities can assist, if 
not exclusively control, probable cause determinations. 
ACCOMMODATING MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITIES 
AND INTUITIVE APPRAISALS 
We live in an uncertain world of probabilities ranging from 
the possible/probable actions of subatomic quarks to the possi-
ble/probable physics taking place below the event horizon of 
black holes. Our task is to develop strategies for management 
of uncertainty-in the small universe of the Fourth Amend-
ment-to manage the level of uncertainty surrounding probable 
cause. 
In Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with 
Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 108 Profes-
sor Barbara D. Underwood explained that prediction can be 
made in a variety of ways, such as by use of individualized 
judgment based on case-specific facts, or by use of formulas 
that assign fixed weights to predetermined characteristics of 
the person matching a profile. Arguments abound for the supe-
riority of either method, and for the extent to which the choice 
of one method precludes use of the alternative method. 
Those who favor individualized assessment would ignore 
338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). 
106 470 U.S. 753 (1989). 
107 Winston, 470 U.S. at 759 (emphasis added). 
108 Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behauior with 
Statistical Inference and Indiuidualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1978-79). 
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available statistical evidence because they prefer to trust the 
subjective judgment of experienced decision makers who evalu-
ate each individual situation in light of accumulated experi-
ence. Such experienced observers may rely on perceptions that 
they cannot articulate as explicit rules or mathematical proba-
bilities, what Professor Underwood refers to as "the gap be-
tween intuitive individualized judgment and statistical infer-
ence."109 
Professor Joseph Grano once offered an explanation of why 
the law of probable cause should insist on case-specific facts 
and discount statistical evidence. He posed a hypothetical in 
which the police could establish, based on case-specific facts, 
that one of ten people must be guilty of a specific crime. Thus, 
"for any suspect selected at random from the group, the odds 
are only ten percent that he is guilty but a whopping ninety 
percent that he is innocent."11° Conceding that at first blush 
ten percent certainty might seem too low for probable cause, 
Professor Grano suggested that 
[s]uch a probability analysis, however, distorts our perspec-
tive. It causes us to overlook the success of the police in nar-
rowing their investigation from the universe of all possible 
suspects, which may include much of the population, to ten 
individuals. In a modern, mobile society, this should be seen 
as a rather significant accomplishment. 111 
He concluded that there is probable cause to arrest each sus-
pect because "[h]aving narrowed the universe of possible sus-
pects to ten, the community would not be unreasonable in re-
quiring all ten, nine of whom are presumably innocent, to sacri-
fice some liberty or privacy to solve the crime."112 
Professor Grano then distinguished the arrest of another 
group of ten based solely on a statistical showing that random 
searches of people on city streets would show one of ten pos-
109 Id. at 1429. 
110 Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the 
Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 496 (1984). 
111 Id. at 497. 
112 Id. 
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sesses a concealed weapon or narcotics. 113 Professor Grano 
maintained that this random search is unacceptable because, 
"under the [F)ourth [A]mendment, it is one thing to demand 
some sacrifice of liberty or privacy when suspicion has focused 
on an individual; it is another to demand such sacrifice when 
no cause whatsoever exists to believe that the individual, as 
opposed to anyone else, is involved with crime."114 I confess 
that Professor Grano's distinct treatment of these two 
hypotheticals escapes me, as does his characterization of a ten 
percent statistical likelihood as "no cause whatsoever." Why is 
this statistical probability of ten percent any less valid probable 
cause than the same ten percent likelihood established by case-
specific facts?115 There are other reasons for objecting to ran-
dom searches, but in assessing likelihoods, one ten percent 
probability is as good as another. 
The strongest argument against random searches is that 
they resemble the general warrants and writs of assistance 
that the framers of the Fourth Amendment sought to prohib-
it.116 English custom inspectors relied upon general warrants 
to search whomever and wherever they pleased, but today's 
government officials might achieve the same result by replacing 
general warrants with statistical likelihoods that are readily 
available or easily created. Thus, searches based wholly on 
statistics could infringe upon the rights of large numbers of 
innocent people. However, the very nature of probable cause 
assumes that some innocents must lose their privacy or liberty 
in order to further law enforcement needs. The proper question 
is how many must surrender their rights, not what type of 
113 Id. at 498. 
u, Id. 
115 Id. If one of Professor Grano's rationales for upholding the case·specific ar-
rests was to reward police for narrowing "much of the population" to ten sus-
pects, why not reward police for researching statistics and narrowing suspects to 
those who are on city streets as opposed to those who are on suburban streets or 
home in bed? 
116 
"The drafting process of the Fourth Amendment reinforces the conclusion 
that suspicionless searches and seizures pursuant to general warrants were the 
initial and primary evils sought to be prevented." Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of 
Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizure, 
25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 527 (1995). 
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factual inference or statistical likelihood leads us to demand 
that surrender, i.e., does it matter whether innocent people lose 
their liberty because of case-specific facts like driving the same 
model and color car as the bank robber,117 or whether they 
lose liberty because they are walking on public streets that 
statistics point to as likely to involve certain crimes? The up-
setting aspect of arresting on a ten percent likelihood of guilt is 
that nine innocents are being sacrificed to apprehend one guilty 
party. These "odds" are equally unacceptable whether the odds 
are computed on the basis of statistics or case-specific facts. 
This is best illustrated by retaining Professor Grano's distinct 
methods of determining the odds of guilt in his hypotheticals, 
but changing the odds themselves. For example, suppose police 
investigation of specific facts points to one of the ten people as 
possessing drugs, while random searches of people on city 
streets would show seven of ten possess narcotics. My choice 
between these two hypotheticals would be the exact opposite of 
Professor Grano's choice. I would prefer sacrificing three in-
nocents on the basis of statistics, to sacrificing nine innocents 
based on the "success of the police in narrowing their investiga-
tion ... to ten individuals." 
Whatever the resolution of hypotheticals like Professor 
Grano's or my hijacking hypothetical, practical considerations 
are also said to point toward preferring intuitive individualized 
judgment over statistical inferences. Because few police officers, 
magistrates, and judges are accustomed to statistical ways of 
thinking and reasoning, they are likely to experience difficulty 
in translating relevant evidence (statistical or otherwise) into 
numerical probabilities. There is always a danger that one's 
opinions and judgments may be altered when they are restated 
numerically. Some commentators thus favor what they term 
117 Insisting on case-specific facts is no guarantee against intrusions on the 
rights of a great number of innocent people. In Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 
721, 722 (1969), the case-specific facts were the rape victim's "description of her 
assailant ... [as) a Negro youth." These facts led to the police taking at least 
twenty-four African-American youths to police headquarters where they were ques-
tioned briefly, fingerprinted, and then released without charge. Do.vis, 394 U.S. at 
722. The police also interrogated forty or fifty other African-American youths 
either at police headquarters, at school, or on the street. Id. 
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"intuitive"' decision making strategies that reflect how statisti-
cally untrained people actually make decisions. They argue 
that "intuition"' is internally coherent and preferable to 
probabilistic logic in the event of conflict. 118 
Recognizing that most police officers cannot express their 
intuitive judgements in terms of explicit probabilities, however, 
does not dictate that all logic be abandoned in favor of police 
consulting entrails and witch doctors when determining proba-
ble cause.119 Even when fact-finders do not make explicit or 
precise probability estimates about issues, their decisions are 
often grounded in implicit estimates. For example, in Delaware 
v. Prouse,120 Justice White relied upon his intuitive apprecia-
tion of the likely statistical impact of random automobile stops. 
He explained that, "[i]t seems common sense that the percent-
age of all drivers on the road who are driving without a license 
is very small and that the number of licensed drivers who will 
be stopped in order to find one unlicensed operator will be 
large indeed."121 Similarly, both common sense and statistics 
tell police that young men commit a hugely disproportionate 
number of crimes. Police factor this into their assessment of 
probable cause even if they cannot quote precise percentages. 
The crudeness of the intuitive probabilistic determinations 
currently used to determine probable cause can be improved 
through use of tools like probability assessment procedures and 
other mathematical techniques.122 Police can be expected to 
improve their assessment of probabilities if they are formally 
trained in probabilistic appraisal techniques. One frequently 
118 Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 75, at 266. 
119 
"The difficulty of practicing an art is no excuse for practicing it stupidly, 
carelessly." JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 222 (2d prtg. 1950) (1949). 
120 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
121 Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1979). 
122 Properly done statistical analyses are hardly less reliable than the intu-
itions, unfounded assumptions and guesswork on which the courts and police 
often rely. See generally Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information 
Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc'V REV. 123, 146 
(1980-81) ("[T]he decision maker whose only tool is intuition will often err .... 
It has been well established for some time now that when the same information 
is available to intuitive humans or a good mathematical model, the human's deci-
sions are consistently less accurate."). 
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cited justification for not using statistical evidence at trial is 
that unsophisticated juries can be misled by pseudo-scientific 
probability analysis. 123 But unlike juries who come and go 
with little or no training, police can be familiarized with the 
proper methods of assessing probabilities. When searches and 
seizures are based on objectively scored factors such as statis-
tics, whatever may be lost in terms of regard for individual 
autonomy could be compensated for by an increase in terms of 
uniformity and neutrality. 
If mathematical precision is not always to be preferred 
over unstructured intuition, at a minimum, mathematical prob-
abilities can supplement traditional methods of assessing prob-
able cause. The practical question that remains is to how often 
will such statistics be available in the real world of search and 
seizure. This question surfaced last year in the oral arguments 
on Maryland v. Pringle. 124 More so than any other case, 
Pringle provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to 
relate probable cause to mathematical probabilities. 
The facts of Pringle were fairly straight-forward: 
In the early morning hours a passenger car occupied by three 
men was stopped for speeding by a police officer. The officer, 
upon searching the car, seized $763 of rolled-up cash from the 
glove compartment and five glassine baggies of cocaine from 
between the back-seat armrest and the back seat. After all 
three men denied ownership of the cocaine and money, the 
officer arrested each of them. 125 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that "the mere finding 
of cocaine in the back armrest when [Pringle] was a front seat 
passenger in a car being driven by its owner is insufficient to 
establish probable cause for an arrest for possession. "126 The 
U.S. Supreme Court ultimately upheld the arrest because 
it was reasonable for the officer to infer a common enterprise 
123 See People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 33 (Cal. 1968). 
12
• 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003). 
120 Pringle, 124 U.S. at 798 
128 Pringle v. State, 805 A.2d 1016, 1027 (Md. 2002), rev'd Maryland v. 
Pringle, 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003). 
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among the three men. The quantity of drugs and cash in the 
car indicated the likelihood of drug dealing, an enterprise to 
which a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent person 
with the potential to furnish evidence against him. 127 
Although Pringle was ultimately decided on the "common 
enterprise" theory, most of the oral arguments128 had proceed-
ed on the assumption that only one of the three occupants of 
the car was guilty. Thus, the arguments explored the question 
of whether a one in three chance of guilt constituted probable 
cause. Government counsel argued that probable cause could 
not be expressed in mathematical terms, while defense 
counsel's opening argument suggested "this is a unique case 
with highly unusual facts" which starkly presented probable 
cause in a numerical fashion. The Court, however, saw it differ-
ently: "You make an interesting opening statement that this is 
highly unusual-we've-a lot of us read a lot of these cases. It 
seems to me this happens all the time, that drugs in the car, 
the person says, it's not mine. It seems to me that that's com-
mon place."129 
Not only was the particular factual situation in Pringle 
commonplace, but the availability of statistical probabilities is 
also much more common than is often realized. Automobile 
search cases in particular seem to abound with readily avail-
able and relevant statistical information. In Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 130 the Court was asked to discount case-specific facts 
and the concept of personal autonomy when ruling on a police 
practice of ordering all motorists out of their vehicles "as a 
matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic 
violation."131 The Court addressed this uniform practice with-
out inquiring whether the individual police officer had any 
case-specific information that a particular motorist was likely 
127 Pringle, 124 S. Ct. at 801. 
128 See infra text accompanying notes 155-56. 
129 Oral arguments at 32-33, Maryland v. Pringle, 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003) (No. 
02-809), auailable at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument 
_transcripts/02-809. pdf. 
130 434 U.S. 106 (1977). 
131 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110; see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) 
(permitting police to order all passengers out of the vehicle) 
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to be armed and dangerous. 132 The Court ultimately conclud-
ed that uniform treatment of motorists as a class was justified 
by statistical evidence "that a significant percentage of murders 
of police officers occur[] when the officers are making traffic 
stops."133 The Court's holding was influenced by one study 
concluding that approximately thirty percent of police shootings 
occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in 
an automobile. 134 
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 135 the 
Court upheld sobriety roadblocks when informed that approxi-
mately 1.6 percent of the drivers passing through the check-
point were arrested for alcohol impairment. 136 In addition, an 
expert witness testified at the trial that experience in other 
states demonstrated that, on the whole, sobriety checkpoints 
resulted in drunken driving arrests of around one percent of all 
motorists stopped.137 When the Court subsequently distin-
guished Sitz in Indianapolis v. Edmond, 138 the Court noted 
that the overall "hit rate" of the program in Edmond was re-
ported as approximately nine percent-about five percent of 
stopped cars in drug checkpoints led to drug arrests and anoth-
er four percent led to arrests for other offenses. 139 
In Delaware v. Prouse140 a majority of the Court accepted 
the government's contention that random stops furthered a 
132 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109. The state conceded that "the officer had no rea-
son to suspect foul play from the particular driver at the time of the stop, there 
having been nothing unusual or suspicious about his behavior." Id. 
133 Id. at 110. (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973)). 
134 Id. at 110. 
135 496 U.S. 444 (1990) 
136 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455. 
1a1 Id. 
138 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
139 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34-35; see also United States v. Montoya de 
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 557 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting one 
physician's estimate "that he had found contraband in only 15 to 20 percent of 
the persons he had examined"); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 
(1976) (noting the ratio of illegal aliens detected to vehicles stopped was approxi-
mately 0.5 percent, and data established that .12% of those initially stopped and 
20% of those referred to a secondary checkpoint were illegal immigrants). 
1
•
0 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
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"vital" state interest in promoting highway safety141 and indi-
cated its willingness to uphold the searches if "in the service of 
these important ends the discretionary spot check is a suffi-
ciently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion upon 
Fourth Amendment interests which such stops entail."142 The 
state, however, was unable to offer any statistics to prove its 
claim that random stops are more efficient than the less intru-
sive checkpoint stops formerly used by the authorities. 143 
Prouse thus found the state's practice unconstitutional on· the 
basis of the state's inability to demonstrate that the method 
was "sufficiently productive" in relation to less intrusive but 
more efficient means of serving the government's purpose.144 
In addition to automobile cases, statistical evidence is often 
used to establish the effectiveness of airport screening pro-
grams, 145 as well as the reliability of human informants146 
and drug sniffing dogs. For example, United States v. 
Limares141 held that probable cause was clearly established 
when the record revealed that the drug sniffing dog had been 
right sixty-two percent of the time. 148 Even when such precise 
statistics are unknown or forgotten, there often remains a 
vague awareness of their general thrust. In one of the most 
famous cases of our era-the 0. J. Simpson case-Professor 
141 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658-60. 
142 Id. at 659. 
143 Id. at 658. 
144 Id. at 659. 
145 For example, 
[i)n the 15 years the [Government's airport screening) program has been 
in effect, more than 9.5 billion persons have been screened, and over 10 
billion pieces of luggage have been inspected. By far the overwhelming 
majority of those persons who have been searched . . . have proved en-
tirely innocent-only 42,000 firearms have been detected during the same 
period. 
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989). 
145 The reliability of informants is often established by citing specific numbers 
establishing their "track record" of past accuracy. See, e.g., United States v. 
Shepard, 714 F.2d 316, 317 (4th Cir. 1983) ("(O]n approximately thirty earlier 
occasions the informant had provided information that had led to over twenty-five 
convictions."). 
1
•
7 269 F.3d 794 (7th Cir. 2001). 
145 Limares, 269 F.3d at 798. 
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William J. Stuntz suggested that the "officers undoubtedly 
knew what Justice Department statistics indicate: that half of 
the women murdered in the United States are killed by their 
husbands or boyfriends. Simple probabilities made Mr. 
Simpson a suspect."149 
In summary, statistical evidence is readily available in 
many cases and should be utilized whenever it exists. When it 
is not available, there would be a powerful incentive to discover 
or create such statistics if the Court announced its preference 
for statistical evidence over unstructured intuition. 150 As sug-
gested earlier, police could be trained in probability assessment 
techniques, and this training could include not only how to 
"think like a statistician," but how to gleam percentages from 
arrest files and other police records. 151 Creating data banks 
showing where past efforts have been most and least produc-
tive could help establish the probability of guilt in particular 
types of recurring situations. 152 
If the courts were to accept that mathematical probabilities 
have a role to play in determining probable cause, the remain-
ing area for consideration is the extent to which the probable 
cause standard itself should be expressed in mathematical 
terms. 
THE LEVEL OF CERTAINTY-PLAYING BY THE NUMBERS? 
149 William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantiue 
Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 846 (2001) (quoting Scott Turow, 
Policing the Police: The D.A. 's Job, in POSTMORTEM: THE 0.J. SIMPSON CASE: 
JUSTICE CONFRONTS RACE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, LAWYERS, MONEY, AND THE ME-
DIA 189, 189-90 (Jeffrey Adamson ed., 1996). 
150 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 131 n.6 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
("Statistical studies of bystander victimization are rare. One study attributes this 
to incomplete recordkeeping and a lack of officially compiled data."). 
1
•
1 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 135 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the United 
States Department of Justice announced that it would appoint an outside monitor 
to ensure that New Jersey State Police keep records on racial statistics and traf-
fic stops). 
152 
"When the Government's interest lies in deterring highly hazardous conduct, 
a low incidence of such conduct, far from impugning the validity of the scheme 
for implementing this interest, is more logically viewed as a hallmark of success." 
United States v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989). 
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The law's principal task is decisionmaking, and 
decisionmaking takes place in a world of uncertainty. A cen-
tral and critical task ... is to specify the degree of certainty 
or likelihood required to support a particular decision. 153 
Although they turned out to be a mere tease, the oral argu-
ments in Maryland u. Pringle dramatically framed the question 
of expressing probable cause in mathematical terms. When 
government counsel asserted that a one in three chance of guilt 
satisfied the probable cause standard, the following exchange 
occurred: 
Court: Why do we call it probable cause? 
Counsel: I think there's a bit of a misnomer there, but clearly 
from the case law of this Court, it means a fair probabili-
ty ... 
Court: But if you had to reduce it to a percentage figure, 
what would you call the percentage required for probable 
cause?154 
Counsel: I don't know that I could, Your Honor. I really don't 
know that it's useful to -
Court: But it's less than 50, though, I gather? 
Counsel: Yes. Your-the cases of this Court has said -
Court: So that takes care of the two people in the room, but 
when you get down to 33-113 with three people? 
Counsel: I think-I think three people clearly would be -
Court: And with four people it would be 25 percent. Is that 
enough? 
Counsel: Probably, probably .... 
Court: ... [Y)ou agree that at some point the probability is-
when the numbers of people present keep increasing, at some 
point the probability is going to be too slim?155 
'
53 Clermont, supra note 82, at 1117 (footnotes omitted). 
154 When asked to quantify the degree of certainty represented by the phrase 
"probable cause," 166 federal judges gave, as an average response, 45. 78%. C.M.A 
McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitu-
tional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1327 (1982). They also equated rea-
sonable suspicion with a 31.34% level of certainty. Id. at 1327-28. 
155 Oral arguments at 14-15, Maryland v. Pringle, 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003) (No. 
02-809), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument 
_ transcripts/02-809. pdf. 
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At another point the Court stated, "you know, it gets worse 
and worse," what if there are ten people in a mini-van or bus 
"so the chance that any individual one did it is ten percent. 
That's still enough [probable cause]?"156 
Pushed down that slippery slope by the Court, counsel's 
only lifeline was the Court's own statements that probable 
cause could not be quantified. 157 But when the Court states 
that probable cause resists definition, the Court is not saying 
that it is logically impossible to attach a probability value to 
probable cause. The question is not whether the law of proba-
ble cause can be precise, but whether it ought to be precise. 
"Although nothing in probability theory determines the choice 
of a probability value for probable cause, nothing in the notion 
of probability prevents the assignment of a specific probability 
value to the legal requirement of probable cause. "158 
The previous sections of this article focused on the method-
ology for determining probable cause, (i.e., whether police 
should utilize statistical studies), and the extent to which police 
should be encouraged to compile statistical records and to ana-
lyze situations in an overtly probabilistic way. At this point, 
however, the concern is no longer about which methodology, as 
an empirical matter, will generate the highest degree of cer-
tainty. The focus now shifts to the degree of certainty required 
by the Constitution. As a substantive legal standard, probable 
cause is independent of the methodology used to assess factual 
likelihoods. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has often confused the 
method of determining factual likelihoods with the constitu-
tionally required degree of certainty. Consider the definition of 
probable cause in Carroll u. United States: 159 "If the facts and 
158 Id. at 13. Professor Grano once asserted that ten percent was enough to 
establish probable cause. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
157 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) ("[P]robable cause is a fluid con-
cept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not 
readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."). 
158 Peter Tillers, Intellectual History, Probability, and the Law of Evidence, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 1465, 1484 (1993). 
159 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
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circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man 
of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been 
committed, it is sufficient."160 This definition specifies a meth-
odology for arriving at probable cause-use prudence and cau-
tion-but merely describes the ultimate arrival point as a "be-
lief' that the offense has been committed. The question that 
remains is how strong must that belief be in order to satisfy 
the constitution? 
Meeting that question head-on would require the Court to 
provide a reasonably precise [perhaps mathematically precise] 
answer, and at times the Court has acknowledged that the first 
principle of Fourth Amendment interpretation is that the con-
stitutional standard must be "workable for application by rank 
and file, trained police officers."161 As Professor LaFave put it, 
Fourth Amendment doctrine 
is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day 
activities and thus ought to be expressed in terms that are 
readily applicable by the police in the context of the law en-
forcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A 
highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, 
ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances 
and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon 
which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but 
they may be "literally impossible of application by the officer 
in the field. "162 
Formulating rules that are clear in application, however, 
says little about the substance of those rules. "Don't search on 
Thursdays" is a clear rule furthering privacy interests; "search 
all teenagers who are in public after 11 p.m." is a clear rule 
diminishing privacy. Does the Fourth Amendment have noth-
160 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 161. 
161 Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 772 0983). Dunaway u. New York, 422 
U.S. 200, 213·14 (1979), held that "[a] single, familiar standard is essential to 
guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and 
balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances 
they confront." Departures from such a standard should be adopted, the Court 
added, reluctantly, and only in "narrowly defined" circumstances. Dunaway, 422 
U.S. at 213-14. 
162 LaFave, supra note 61, at 141 (footnotes omitted). 
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ing to say about the desirability of these equally clear rules? 
Once the Court settles on the conditions under which a search 
or seizure may occur, we would all hope that the Court will be 
as lucid as possible in defining the contours of such reasonable 
searches. This is mom and apple pie stuff, and the police do not 
have a unique perspective in preferring clarity over ambigu-
ity .163 But if clarity is all that the police want,164 one very 
clear rule would be-"when in doubt, don't search"-or at least 
don't search when the level of doubt drops below an acceptable 
risk of error. 
The problem with quests for clear rules defining probable 
cause is that 
any attempt to achieve certainty regarding any important 
constitutional issue is unlikely to succeed and-even if it does 
succeed in the short run-will inevitably create uncertainty 
as to more issues than it settles. The process of rendering a 
decision will tend to distort the issue decided as well as the 
applicable precedents and doctrines. 165 
Thus, the Court has acknowledged that because so many vari-
ables exist in the probable cause equation, "one determination 
will seldom be a useful 'precedent' for another."166 In the end, 
even seemingly "bright-line" rules usually become blurred as 
the police and the adversarial process test their outer limits, 
and "[t]he grail of'rule-oriented' jurisprudence is as mythical as 
163 
"[A) body of law is more rational and more civilized when every rule it con-
tains is referred articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves, and 
when the grounds for desiring that end are stated or are ready to be stated in 
words." Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 
186 (1920). 
164 Professor LaFave did not advocate clarity as the sole or dominant consider-
ation, but instead argued that clarity plays a role in the calculus of balancing 
government and individual interests. He suggested that a rule theoretically correct 
only 95% of the time, but understandable in virtually all cases is preferable to a 
rule that is 100% theoretically correct, but which police could correctly apply only 
75% of the time. Wayne R. LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: 
Further Ventures into the "Quagmire, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9, 30 n.76 (1972). 
165 Craig M. Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 
DUKE L.J. l, 2. 
166 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 n.11 (1983). 
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King Arthur's."167 
The inability to formulate clear rules or precise probability 
levels governing probable cause has lead the Court to adopt one 
over-arching rule for the police-just use your common sense 
and act reasonably. In an imperfect world where correct an-
swers are uncertain, a "pragmatic" Court recognizes that it 
must muddle through to the best of its ability, and that it can 
hardly ask more from the police. Thus, the Court often deter-
mines the constitutionality of police conduct "by resorting to a 
malleable 'objective' test of reasonableness viewed from the 
police officer's perspective,"168 and "any police conduct that is 
'understandable' in the circumstances according to common 
sense [will] be judged 'reasonable' for purposes of assessing the 
constitutionality of police intrusions."169 
As formulated in Terry v. Ohio, 170 the legal standard be-
comes whether "the facts available to the officer at the moment 
of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable cau-
tion in the belief that the action taken was appropriate."171 
The Terry Court was misguided, however, in its suggestion that 
167 Slobogin, supra note 88, at 71. 
166 Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amend-
ment Theory, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 199, 265 (1993); see also Phyllis T. Bookspan, 
Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 
VAND. L. REV 473, 477 (1991). 
Although the (F]ourth [A)mendment conveys to "the People [the right) to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" the reasonableness 
approach focuses on the acts of the police instead of the rights of the 
people. The question, then, becomes whether the police acted reasonably 
rather than whether a person's rights were violated. This approach en-
dorses retrospective evaluations of police behavior rather than prospective 
protections. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
169 Thomas Y. Davis, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v. 
Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and 
Exaggerates the Excusability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. REV. 1, 52-53 (1991); see 
also Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 (stating probable cause "does not deal with hard cer-
tainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articu-
lated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about 
human behavior; jurors as factfmders are permitted to do the same--and so are 
law enforcement officers."). 
110 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
171 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. 
2004] THE ODDS ON PROBABLE CAUSE 319 
a police officer could choose the constitutionally appropriate 
action by employing a common sense, seat-of-the pants assess-
ment. 172 The crucial mistake in Terry was using the word 
"reasonable" as a term of art synonymous with constitutional-
ity, and at the same time, a description of the searching 
officer's rational analysis of the situation. By equating reason-
ableness as a process of logical thought with reasonableness as 
a standard of constitutionally permissible behavior, the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment are reduced to a prohibi-
tion against irrational police actions. As Justice Stevens 
charged, the Court acts "on the assumption that the constitu-
tional protection against 'unreasonable' seizures requires 
nothing more than a hypothetically rational basis for intrusions 
on individual liberty."173 
If taken seriously, deference to the reasonably prudent 
police officer's common sense is "an invitation to reviewing 
courts to treat a police intrusion as 'reasonable' if any explana-
tion for the police conduct can be given."174 Admittedly, this 
approach requires something more than whimsy or caprice by 
police officers, 175 but even a five percent likelihood that 
172 Terry's statement regarding a belief "that the action taken was appropriate" 
is a meaningless generality to the police officer on the street. Wayne R. LaFave, 
Street Encounters and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 
MICH. L. REV. 39, 64 (1968). But see Stuntz, supra note 91, at 2175. However, 
Stuntz states that 
[n]o one knows how to craft a legal formula that will tell officers how to 
behave in advance. That problem, however, need not be solved; vagueness 
in legal definitions is a more tolerable vice than law professors tend to 
think. The problem that needs addressing is not definition but applica-
tion-the question is not whether we can come up with the right legal 
terminology, but whether police officers can know roughly where the 
boundaries are in practice. Maybe they can. "I know it when I see it" has 
a bad reputation in legal circles, but the reputation is undeserved. Some-
times, consider-all-the-circumstances standards work tolerably well in spite 
of their linguistic muddiness-for all the muddiness, bottom lines may be 
reasonably predictable. 
Id. at 2175. 
173 Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 422 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
m Davis, supra note 169, at 57. 
175 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 543 (1985) (noting 
customs inspectors had more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
hunch"). "The clear incentive that operated in the past to establish probable cause 
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seizable items are present in the place to be searched estab-
lishes that the basis for the search is rational and not wholly 
arbitrary. Allowing police to act on such minimal odds, howev-
er, would lead to an unacceptable number of unnecessarily 
invasive and harassing searches and seizures. 176 The cost to 
the victims of such unnecessary intrusions is obvious, but the 
state also has an "economic" interest because "[t]he lower the 
level of certainty required for a search and seizure, the more 
state resources will be wasted in conducting it, since more 
mistakes will occur."177 
Trusting probable cause determinations to a police officer's 
common sense also runs contra to the intent of the framers of 
the Fourth Amendment. Is it plausible they drafted the War-
rant Clause and the probable cause requirement merely to 
insure that the police had some minimally rational basis for 
exercising their power? 
It seems unlikely the Framers would have accepted that the 
government can bestow generalized discretionary authority on 
a police officer through the credential of a metal police 
badge ... when they clearly would not have allowed the same 
officer to be given the same generalized discretionary authori-
ty in the form of a paper general warrant. 178 
Most importantly, deferring to the officer's exercise of com-
mon sense conflicts with the Court's view of the Fourth Amend-
ment as requiring a delicate balance between the governmental 
interest and the individual interest in privacy or liberty. De-
spite the Court's protestations that it balances interests only in 
has now been so completely vitiated that the police need only show that it was 
not 'entirely unreasonable' under the circumstances of a particular case for them 
to believe that the warrant they were issued was valid." United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, 957 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
176 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 133 n.8 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(noting in a two-year period, the "New York City Police Department Street 
Crimes Unit made 45,000 stops, only 9,500, or 20%, of which resulted in arrest;" 
"in 1997, New York City's Street Crimes Unit conducted 27,061 stop-and-frisks, 
only 4,647 of which, 17%, resulted in arrest"). 
177 Slobogin, supra note 88, at 61 n.196. 
178 Davis, supra note 169, at 53 n.203. 
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"special need" cases, 179 or only where the probable cause stan-
dard does not apply,180 the Court has never explained why it 
sometimes uses balancing and sometimes uses rigid rules. 181 
The Court's vacillation between a rigid definition of probable 
cause and the ultimate flexibility of balancing has replaced its 
bipolar approach to the relationship between the amendment's 
warrant clause and the reasonableness clause. 182 Justice 
Thomas' recent comment on that legendary schizophrenia can 
be paraphrased to apply equally to the Court's vacillation on 
probable cause: "Our cases stand for the illuminating proposi-
tion that [probable cause is a uniform standard], except, of 
course, when [it is] not."183 
Stripped of qualifiers, modifiers, and outright obfuscation, 
the true essence of the Court's overall approach is that '"the 
balancing of competing interests' [is] 'the key principle of the 
Fourth Amendment."'184 Probable cause is but one of many 
forms or. levels of justification for reasonable searches and 
seizures, and it would be a strange jurisprudence that utilized 
the balancing of government and individual interests for all 
constitutional intrusions except those based on probable cause. 
The very idea of balancing implies that each side has some 
merit; that some privacy interests outweigh some government 
interests; and that all forms of privacy cannot be set aside 
merely because the government offers a modicum of rational 
justification for the intrusion. Determining which justifications 
are sufficient for which types of intrusions requires something 
179 Slobogin, supra note 88, at 25. 
180 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979) (stating that because the 
balancing test of Terry v. Ohio "involved an exception to the general rule requir-
ing probable cause, this Court has been careful to maintain its narrow scope"). 
m Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis M. Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Con-
stitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 22 (1988) (noting the Court's failure to ex-
plain when it balances and when it uses rigid rules). 
182 See generally Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment's Two Clauses, 
26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389 (1989). 
183 The original statement was: "Our cases stand for the illuminating propo-
sition that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, except, of course, when 
they are not." Groh v. Ramirez, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1299 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing). 
184 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 
452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981)}. 
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other than ostensibly value-free objective rationality on the 
part of police officers. For example, the police officer in Tennes-
see v. Garner acted rationally, but unreasonably in the constitu-
tional sense, by using deadly force against a non-dangerous 
fleeing felon. 185 The use of such force was rational because it 
had been approved by common law and adhered to by a majori-
ty of modern police departments. 186 Nonetheless, its use be-
came constitutionally unreasonable in cases involving non-
dangerous felons, 187 because the balance was now to be struck 
in favor of an individual's right to life, which outweighed 
society's interest in effective law enforcement. 
Judicial balancing of the conflicting considerations in Gar-
ner, Terry, and other Fourth Amendment cases furthers one of 
the images of how justice is done, i.e., one case at a time, tak-
ing into account all the circumstances, and identifying within 
that context the right outcome-reasonableness under the cir-
cumstances. 188 But the reasonable or fair result in a particu-
lar case is but one of a number of competing values. Often con-
tradicting the quest for individual justice is the need for equal 
treatment of similarly situated individuals, the need for com-
prehensible and stable laws to guide law enforcement officials, 
and the larger concerns of general society.189 It is impossible 
for the Supreme Court to maintain its institutional concern for 
general principles and to remain totally responsive to the pecu-
185 Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. 
188 Id. at 12. 
187 Id. at 11 (stating deadly force may be used only "(wJhere the officer has 
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical 
harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to 
prevent escape by using deadly force"). 
188 The genius of the common law, so the theory goes, was that by sticking 
close to the facts of the case, the law would grow and develop, not through the 
pronouncement of general principles, but case-by-case, incrementally, one step at a 
time. The meaning of the rule emerges, develops and changes in the course of 
applying it to specific facts. 
'
89 
"[T)he law does undoubtedly treat the individual as a means to an 
end .... " OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35 (Mark DeWolfe 
Howe ed., The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881). "[J]ustice to 
the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of 
the scales." Id. at 41. 
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liarities of each case. 190 
Although the Court cannot avoid the dichotomy between 
uniform application of law and responsiveness to individual 
situations, between universe and context, between sameness 
and difference, the Court can achieve an accommodation. The 
accommodation I suggest is twofold: 1) the fiction of one uni-
form definition of probable cause must be replaced with a flexi-
ble sliding scale that takes account of the severity of the intru-
sion and the magnitude of the threat; and 2) the amorphous 
approach of balancing the totality of the circumstances must be 
replaced with a fixed number of structured categories reflecting 
multiple layers of probable cause. The goal of this suggested 
approach is to achieve an appropriate or at least workable 
blending of flexibility and calibration. 
FLEXIBILITY 
"Decision theorists insist that the problem of choice always 
involves two questions: (a) What are the odds?, and (b) What's 
at stake?"191 We cannot settle on an appropriate level of prob-
able cause [the odds] until we can assess the importance of the 
interests at stake. On any scale of importance, the interests in 
the two airplane hypotheticals at the start of this article must 
be seen as poles apart. Terrorists and illegal smokers are both 
criminals, but hardly constitute the same threat to society. 
When computing the odds for probable cause, it seems obvious 
that a low level of probability should suffice when the stakes 
involve a terrorist threat. Conversely, we would expect that a 
high level of probability must be satisfied when the stakes are 
limited to the possible escape of an illegal smoker. 
Despite this obvious truism, the Court often clings to the 
190 The Court's prime institutional task is to deal with issues of significant 
public interest, not merely to do justice to the particular parties of the relatively 
rare case in which certiorari has been granted. 
191 Barbara J. Shapiro, "Beyond Reasonable Doubtn and "Probable Causen: His-
torical Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence, 91 MICH. L. REV. 
1465, 1486 (1983). 
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fiction that probable cause is a "single, familiar standard,"192 
and that distinctions among crimes are irrelevant when it co-
mes to regulating criminal investigations.193 This rigid view of 
probable cause requires the police to pinpoint their level of 
certainty to some fixed, but undefined, percentage that applies 
equally to illegal smokers and terrorists. In contrast to the 
rigidness of probable cause, the reasonable suspicion standard 
of Terry has evolved into a variable standard, calibrated to the 
degree of both the privacy intrusion and the state interest. 
Thus, reasonable suspicion is "not simply a lower standard 
than probable cause, but a different kind of standard."194 The 
flexibility exemplified in the balancing approach of Terry is an 
appropriate model for an expanded definition of probable cause 
that would take account of the severity of the suspected crime. 
In Judge Posner's words, "probable cause-the area between 
bare suspicion and virtual certainty--describes not a point but 
a zone, within which the graver the crime the more latitude the 
police must be allowed."195 
One objection to calibrating the level of probable cause 
according to the severity of the suspected crime is the difficult 
timing considerations facing courts and police. At the time 
most searches and arrests take place, the police do not know 
192 Dunaway u. New York, 422 U.S. 200, 213 (1979), rejected "a multifactor 
balancing test" of reasonable police conduct under the circumstances, because a 
"single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limit-
ed time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests 
involved in the specific circumstances they confront." 
193 In Brinegar u. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), Justice Jackson stated 
that 
we must remember that the authority which we concede to conduct 
searches and seizures without warrant may be exercised by the most 
unfit and ruthless officers as well as by the fit and responsible, and re-
sorted to in case of petty misdemeanors as well as in the case of the 
gravest felonies. 
Id. at 182 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
1
.. Lerner, supra note 13, at 1002. 
195 Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1566 (7th Cir. 1985) (en bane); see 
Amar, supra note 6, at 784 ("To begin with, probable cause cannot be a fixed 
standard. It would make little sense to insist on the same amount of probability 
regardless of the imminence of the harm, the intrusiveness of the search, the 
reason for the search, and so on."). 
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precisely what crime occurred. In contrast, by the time a court 
rules on the constitutionality of a search, the litigants typically 
have established the nature of the alleged crime with precision. 
The contrast between the initially suspected crime and the 
offense subsequently discovered can be drastic. By way of illus-
tration, consider the following two situations. First, upon hear-
ing loud screams from an apartment, a police officer concludes 
that someone's life is in immediate danger. He breaks down the 
door, follows the screams, and finds an uninhibited couple 
making love. Second, a police officer outside an apartment 
building detects an odor he believes is the smell of burning 
marijuana. He rushes into the apartment and finds that the 
odor comes from a decomposing body. In both situations, the 
court faces almost unbearable pressure to evaluate the 
government's justification for initiating the search in light of 
the facts known at trial. 196 In the latter situation, the court 
might wish to deter overzealous and faulty investigations of 
marijuana smoking, but it requires a truly Herculean effort to 
suppress evidence of a dead body. Conversely, the court might 
prefer to encourage the first officer's concern for saving lives, 
but it is difficult to overlook this intrusion into the marital 
bedroom. Thus, the criticism goes, factoring the severity of 
crimes into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would only com-
pound the dangers of hindsight judgment which inhere in the 
remedy of exclusion of evidence at trial. 
Although this criticism is valid, it is not impossible to over-
come. Courts routinely struggle with excluding reliable evi-
dence because of legal rules holding such evidence to be inad-
missible. For example, evidence that a defendant committed 
crimes similar to the crime currently charged at trial must be 
excluded unless some exception applies, such as showing that 
the previous crimes establish the modus operandi used in the 
current charge. It may be distasteful for a trial judge to exclude 
196 
"[A]fter-the-event justification for the . . . search (is] too likely to be subtly 
influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment." Beck v. Ohio, 379 
U.S. 89, 96 (1964). 
326 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 74 
a defendant's lengthy rap sheet, 197 but no more or less so 
than requiring the judge to focus exclusively on what police 
suspected pre-search, regardless of what we now know. As to 
the difficulty of police making pre-search evaluations-i.e., ask-
ing them to classify cases by the severity of the underlying 
crime before the details of the crime are known-rough esti-
mates or classifications of suspected crimes are everyday occur-
rences when police and prosecutors decide where to put their 
investigative resources. "All police forces and all prosecutors' 
offices make up-front judgments about the seriousness of al-
leged crimes."198 A concept of probable cause that recognizes 
four or five classes of crimes ranging from the most serious to 
the least, would not require police or courts to make unman-
ageably complex judgments. 199 
A more theoretical objection to weighing the severity of the 
suspected crime is that the Fourth Amendment would become 
unique in lowering constitutional rights when society's interest 
is strong. 
For example, the state's admittedly great interest in solving a 
murder does not permit a relaxation of the right to remain 
silent, the right to jury trial, the right to counsel, or- most 
analogous to the subject of the present discussion-the bur-
den of proof; if anything, given the greater consequences that 
flow from a murder conviction, we are more protective of 
these rights in homicide cases. 200 
One way to avoid this objection, or at least diminish its impact, 
is to return to the original concerns that led the Terry Court to 
create a new form of justification and a lower level of certainty 
197 The exclusion of probative evidence in order to serve some other policy is 
by no means unique to the Fourth Amendment. Dean Wigmore devoted an entire 
volume to such exclusionary rules of evidence. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (J. 
McNaughton rev., 1961) (discussing, inter alia, marital privilege, attorney-client 
privilege, communications among jurors, state secrets privilege, physician-patient 
privilege, priest-penitent privilege). 
198 Stuntz, supra note 149, at 870. 
199 For example, courts and police would find the following categories fairly 
easy to distinguish: violent crime; nonviolent, nondrug crime; serious drug crime; 
and less serious drug crime. Id. 
200 Slobogin, supra note 88, at 52. 
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for a seizure. Terry focused not on solving past crimes, but on 
preventing an impending crime and protecting against future 
harm to a police officer. "[T]he very point of Terry was to per-
mit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative 
stops before crimes are committed . . . . [W]hereas probable 
cause looks for past or present illegalities, an underlying pur-
pose of Terry is to grant officers the ability to prevent future 
wrongdoing. "201 When future danger is significant, the 
government's interests expand to include protection of the com-
munity as well as solving past crimes.202 
The amount of information that prudent police will collect 
before deciding to make a search or an arrest, and hence the 
amount of probable cause they will have, is a function of the 
gravity of the crime, and especially the danger of its imminent 
repetition. If a multiple murderer is at large, the police must 
compress their investigation and make the decision to search 
or arrest on less information than if they could investigate at 
their leisure. 203 
Perhaps the best example of the benefits and pitfalls of 
distinguishing between past and future harm is the Sirhan 204 
case in 1968, where society faced a possible terrorist threat, 
before the word terrorist became a familiar part of our collec-
tive consciousness. At approximately midnight on June 4, 1968, 
Senator Robert Kennedy, a candidate for the Democratic Presi-
201 United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 326-27 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 
No. 04-5795, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 544 (2005). 
202 Consider this "thought experiment" posed by Professor George Thomas: 
Suppose the authorities on the evening of September 10 had a choice 
between foiling the plot and causing the terrorists to flee or arresting all 
nineteen hijackers after the planes had done their destruction. (I have no 
idea how this would be possible, but it is only a thought experiment). 
George C. Thomas III, Terrorism, Race and a New Approach to Consent Searches, 
73 MISS. L.J. 525, 536 (2003). Professor Thomas concluded that the dominant pur-
pose should be to protect the public safety even if it meant that no one would be 
arrested or convicted. Id. 
203 Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1566 (7th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (emphasis 
added). 
204 People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1972), overruled by Hawans v. Supe-
rior Court, 586 P.2d 916 (Cal. 1978). 
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dential nomination, was shot and killed by Sirhan Sirhan. 205 
At 10:30 a.m. the next day, police entered Sirhan's house, with-
out a warrant,206 and "began 'a general search' ... to deter-
mine both 'whether or not there was anyone else involved in 
[the crime]' and 'whether or not there were any other things 
that would be relative to the crime.'"207 In the defendant's 
bedroom, the police found a diary that was introduced at the 
trial.208 
The warrantless "general search"209 of a private dwelling 
and the seizure of a personal diary intruded upon the most 
sacrosanct aspects of privacy. Balanced against these interests 
were 1) the severity of the crime, and 2) the threat of a nation-
wide panic that could follow a political assassination. The Su-
preme Court of California upheld the search because 
[t]he crime was one of enormous gravity, and the "gravity of 
the offense" is an appropriate factor to take into consider-
ation. The victim was a major presidential candidate, and a 
crime of violence had already been committed against him. 
The crime thus involved far more than idle threats. Although 
the officers did not have reasonable cause to believe that the 
house contained evidence of a conspiracy to assassinate prom-
inent political leaders, we believe that the mere possibility 
that there might be such evidence in the house fully warrant-
ed the officers' actions. It is not difficult to envisage what 
would have been the effect on this nation if several more 
political assassinations had followed that of Senator Kennedy. 
Today when assassinations of persons of prominence have 
205 Sirhan, 497 P.2d at 1126. 
208 Id. at 1138. 
'
07 Id. at 1141. 
208 Id. at 1138. 
209 The court noted that: 
The scope of the search must, of course, be 'strictly tied to and justified 
by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. . . . Even 
if the exigent circumstances in this case made lawful a warrantless 
search only for evidence of a possible conspiracy to assassinate prominent 
political leaders, it is clear from the record that the officers were search· 
ing for such evidence. Only a thorough search in the house could insure 
that there was no evidence therein of such a conspiracy. 
Id. at 1141 (citations omitted). 
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repeatedly been committed in this country, it is essential that 
law enforcement officers be allowed to take fast action in 
their endeavors to combat such crimes. 210 
No one can dispute the court's appraisal of the crime as 
one of enormous gravity. But solving such a horrendous crime 
does not necessitate dispensing with a warrant and lowering 
the level of probable cause to a "mere possibility." The defen-
dant had been caught in the act, gun in hand, in front of a con-
siderable number of eye witnesses. With or without the seized 
diary, there was little possibility that the defendant would be 
acquitted. The true justification for the search lies in the 
Court's recognition of the danger of continuing assassinations 
of political leaders and the possible ensuing public panic. The 
Sirhan Court took judicial notice that "only two months [before 
the assassination of Senator Kennedy] Reverend Martin Luther 
King, Jr., had been assassinated, and less than five years pre-
viously the victim's brother, President John F. Kennedy."211 
The court could have also added that the race riots in the 
Watts section of Los Angeles had occurred within the past 
three years, and that the summer of 1968 saw increased chal-
lenges (violent and peaceful) to the Vietnam War. 
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the particular result 
in Sirhan, the court's concern for future harm provides some 
guidance for resolving our hijacking hypothetical. The thwarted 
hijacking in our hypothetical did not result in anyone's death, 
and to that extent the past harm is distinct from the tragic 
assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy. But the major con-
cern in the hypothetical (as in the Sirhan case) is whether 
these would-be hijackers were an isolated group, or part of a 
wide-scale attack that might still be unfolding. When imminent 
damage to society is anticipated, the state may legitimately 
point to a need for loosening investigative restrictions. 
Of course we must guard against overreacting and seeing 
terrorists plots behind every serious crime. Under current law, 
because the threatened harm is not an element of the probable 
210 Id. at 1140 (emphasis added). 
211 Id. at 1140 n.18. 
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cause analysis, the government never has to produce any hard 
proof of alleged threats. Instead, the government often uses 
veiled suggestions of serious harm, implicitly seeking a gener-
ous judicial approach to the government's search and seizure 
powers. A humorous, but not atypical, example occurred during 
the oral arguments for Maryland v. Pringle when the Court 
asked whether it would be significant if the seized drugs had 
been in a locked trunk rather than in the back seat of the 
car.212 Counsel responded: "[I]f there had been a large quanti-
ty of drugs in the trunk or if there had been a dead body in the 
trunk .... "213 At least on this occasion, the Court instructed 
counsel not to speculate in this manner-"Well, let's stick to 
the five-these five bags that were stuck in a Ziploc bag. The 
Ziploc bag is in the trunk, not a dead body."214 Although this 
was a fairly innocuous illustration, history has multiple exam-
ples (ranging from the "communist menace" during the McCar-
thy era; to the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the 
post-9/11 era) of the government's tendency to exaggerate and 
manipulate perceived "threats" as justifications for expanding 
government power and limiting individual liberty. What we 
gain from placing threats of future harm within the calculus of 
probable cause is the opportunity to force the government to 
produce hard evidence of any perceived threat. 
In addition to showing-not merely speculating-that a 
specific, significant danger exists, the government should have 
to demonstrate that the danger cannot be averted unless the 
usual level of certainty is lowered. For example, when the De-
partment of Home Land Defense obtained information of ter-
rorists threats during the 2003 holiday travel season, the coun-
try was placed on heightened alert and several flights from 
London to the United States were cancelled until further inves-
tigation could occur. This seems like an eminently sensible and 
fair way to proceed, and preferable to sacrificing additional 
212 Oral Arguments at 8, Maryland v. Pringle, 124 S. Ct 795 (2003) (No. 02-
809), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_tran-
scripts/02-809.pdf. 
213 Id. at 9. 
2
" Id. 
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passengers' rights as the only response to a possible threat. 
Lowering the level of certainty required for searches and sei-
zures should be reserved for the most serious and immediate 
threats when the government has few, if any, alternatives. 215 
If the threat is not immediate, then "[a]n alternative to all 
modes of search is more police work: more interviewing of wit-
nesses, more surveillance, more poring over documents, more 
informer recruitment, more of whatever police do, other than 
searching, to solve or create cases. "216 For example, when the 
only threat of future harm is that a smoker might again smoke 
in an airplane or other prohibited area, the police can act at 
their leisure when investigating the case against the suspected 
smokers. 
Focusing on future versus past harm also helps avoid a 
paradox that has sometimes arisen in the Court's analysis of 
probable cause. In Winston v. Lee, the government sought a 
court order to remove a bullet from the defendant's body so 
that a ballistics test of the bullet could tie the defendant to a 
thwarted burglary.217 The Court recognized that such an ex-
treme invasion of privacy should not be justified by the rela-
tively low level of certainty required to satisfy ordinary proba-
ble cause. Instead, the Court examined whether there was a 
"compelling need" for the removal of the bullet or whether the 
prosecution had access to sufficient alternative methods of 
proving guilt at trial. 218 In effect, the Court created another 
form and level of probable cause which managed to hook the 
government on the horns of a dilemma: if the facts were suffi-
cient to establish a high degree of likelihood that the bullet was 
present in the defendant's body, then these same facts, when 
presented at trial, could circumstantially establish the location 
of the bullet. Thus, there was no compelling need to actually 
remove the bullet. The Court gave full effect to this paradox by 
215 
"[!Intuitively we agree that less antecedent cause should be required as the 
need for the police conduct becomes more urgent." Grano, supra note 110, at 504. 
216 Steven Duke, Making Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405, 1418 (1986). 
217 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 756 (1985). 
218 Winston, 470 U.S. at 765-66. The Court considered whether prohibiting the 
intrusion would affect "the community's interest in fairly and accurately determin-
ing guilt or innocence." Id. at 762. 
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holding that the government's strong circumstantial case with-
out the bullet demonstrated that there was inadequate justi-
fication for such an extreme intrusion into the privacy of the 
defendant's body.219 The Court turned out to be correct be-
cause the defendant was ultimately convicted based on circum-
stantial evidence.220 This type of analysis of the likelihood of 
finding the evidence and the need for the evidence to prove a 
past crime has only marginal relevance to the separate concern 
for preventing future harm. For example, the paradox would 
not exist if the government had compelling circumstantial evi-
dence that a suspect had swallowed a capsule with the names 
of terrorists planning a future attack, and the government now 
sought court approval to forcibly extract the capsule. 
To return to our hypotheticals once again, if the govern-
ment has strong circumstantial evidence that a particular pas-
senger is a smoker (e.g., tobacco smell on clothing, cigarette 
lighter in briefcase, etc.), that evidence can be presented to a 
jury, and the past crime of smoking on an airplane can be 
proved without the need to search the passenger's house for 
additional evidence that he is a smoker. In contrast, no matter 
how strong the evidence is that a hypothetical terrorist is 
guilty of attempted hijacking, even a slight indication of a wid-
er terrorist plot might be adequate justification to search his 
house in order to prevent future terrorists attacks. 
In summary, the concept of adequate justification for 
searches and seizures must be made flexible enough to take 
account of the severity of the underlying crime, and even more 
importantly, the severity of the threat of future harm. At some 
point, the future danger may be so great that lessening consti-
tutional protections might be necessary. As Justice Jackson 
cautioned in another context, "[t]he choice is not between order 
and liberty. It is between liberty with order and anarchy with-
219 Id. at 765. "[A)lthough the bullet may turn out to be useful to the Com-
monwealth in prosecuting [Lee), the Commonwealth has failed to demonstrate a 
compelling need for it. We believe that in these circumstances the Commonwealth 
has failed to demonstrate that it would be 'reasonable' . . . to search for evidence 
of this crime by means of the contemplated surgery." Id. at 766. 
220 See Clyde Burrows, 10 Years Giuen Man with Bullet in Shoulder, RICH-
MOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 1985, at Al. 
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out either. There is danger that, if the Court does not temper 
its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will con-
vert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact. "221 
CATEGORIES 
It is relatively easy to distinguish the severity of the past 
crime and the future threat in the two airplane hypotheticals 
at the start of this article. The difficult task that remains is to 
draw the line or lines distinguishing and categorizing situa-
tions somewhere between these polar extremes. The difficulty 
of the task inheres in its very formulation because to suggest 
categories instantly gives rise to the question-how many cate-
gories? Two, three, forty?222 As Professor Amsterdam put it 
thirty years ago: 
[A]ny number of categories, however shaped, is too few to en-
compass life and too many to organize it manageably. The 
question remains at what level of generality and in what 
shape rules should be designed in order to encompass all that 
can be encompassed without throwing organization to the 
wolves."223 
We can seek guidance on categorization from the experts on the 
psychology of decision making and from that ultimate legal de-
cision maker-the Supreme Court. 
Cognitive psychology examines "how we detect, transform, 
store, retrieve, and use information from our environment. "224 
In Procedure's Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases for 
Standards of Decision, Professor Kevin M. Clermont reflects on 
experimental investigations which indicate that humans have 
built-in cognitive limitations, and that most of us can only 
identify around seven distinguishable categories or a seven 
221 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
222 
"Using a larger number of categories might reap larger gains, as there are 
always potential gains from fine-tuning legal rules. . . . It is true that too much 
fine-tuning can be costly: consistency may suffer, and police may ignore or evade 
the law if it becomes too complex." Stuntz, supra note 149, at 870-71 n.93. 
223 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. 
L. REV. 349, 377 (1974). 
2
"' Clermont, supra note 82, at 1134. 
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point rating scale.225 In an effort to make sound probability 
assessments better fit humans, not the impracticable reverse, 
Professor Clermont has suggested that "the law usually does, 
realistically can, and optimally should recognize only seven 
categories of uncertainty in its standards of decision: (1) slight-
est possibility, (2) reasonable possibility, (3) substantial possi-
bility, (4) equipoise, (5) probability, (6) high probability and (7) 
almost certainty."226 With some slight tinkering, those seven 
categories can be edited down to accord with what I believe are 
five categories of certainty currently recognized by the Supreme 
Court. 
The initial editing involves discarding two levels of certain-
ty on practical grounds. The first to go is "equipoise" because 
the police need a standard of decision, not a standard of inac-
tion where they are paralyzed by doubt. Also, as a practical 
matter, situations where the facts on either side are in exact 
equilibrium rarely appear in the real world of search and sei-
zure where the police usually deal with vague estimates of 
probabilities, not mathematical precision. About the only time 
perfect equilibrium might arise is when and if statistical likeli-
hoods are exactly balanced. But even in such cases there would 
almost always be case-specific facts that would tip the balance 
one way or the other. For example, our hijacking hypothetical 
poses exact equilibrium-a 50/50 likelihood of guilt as to each 
passenger-but adding facts such as the airline attendant's 
voice recognition or even something as minor as police observa-
tion of which passengers seem nervous, would take the deci-
sion-maker off of dead center. In short, the law of probable 
cause need not concern itself with the largely theoretical con-
cern of how to deal with "equipoise." 
The second level of certainty to be discarded is the "almost 
certain" level. Whether this level is equated with beyond a 
reasonable doubt or some even higher standard, it really has no 
place at the preliminary investigation stage. Certainly the 
framers of the Fourth Amendment never contemplated such a 
restrictive standard, and the Court has never indicated that it 
225 Id. at 1134-35. 
22
• Id. at 1156. 
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might raise the bar to require this level of certainty. 
With the elimination of the "almost certain" and "equi-
poise" levels of certainty, the five remaining categories of un-
certainty match up with the Supreme Court's approach, al-
though two of these categories are not acknowledged as such by 
the Court. At present the Court admits to recognizing three 
categories of justification for a search or seizure: (1) traditional 
probable cause; (2) reasonable suspicion; and (3) a balancing of 
individual and government interests under the general rubric 
of reasonableness. Although the Court resists the label, there 
are two other levels of justification for search and seizure: ( 4) 
"non-searches" which require no justification;227 and (5) ex-
treme intrusions into personal liberty such as the use of deadly 
force 228 or surgical intrusion into the suspect's body,229 
which require the highest level of justification. 
SEARCHES FORMERLY KNOWN AS "NON-SEARCHES" 
A government practice of placing skymarshals on airplanes 
intrudes on personal privacy to the extent that "big brother is 
watching" and the passengers have a diminished " right to be 
let alone, the right most valued by civilized men."230 The 
Court, however, deals with such diminimus intrusions by plac-
ing them beyond the coverage of the Fourth Amendment, and 
thus relieves the government of any need to justify its actions. 
An expansive view of "non-searches" may have been necessary 
when probable cause was seen as the sole and relatively high 
standard for all searches and seizures. Under such a monolithic 
Fourth Amendment, the Court was faced with many cases in 
which it could either impose a probable cause standard that the 
government could not meet, or place certain intrusions beyond 
227 For example, undercover activity, searches of "open fields" and voluntary 
police-citizen encounters fall into this category. 
22
• Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) 
229 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). 
230 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1929) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). 
336 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 74 
the scope of the Fourth Amendment. 231 However, with a flexi-
ble approach to probable cause and with a suggested standard 
of certainty as low as "slight possibility," these intrusions can 
be brought within the amendment's scope, where they properly 
belong.232 
The question arises as to whether this suggested approach 
amounts to anything but word play. What do we gain by bring-
ing most "non-searches" within the amendment's coverage if 
that coverage merely requires a level of justification as low as a 
slight possibility? In the case of the skymarshals, "search" 
versus "non-search" may be a distinction without a difference. 
The potential harm of a skyjacking is so great that lowering 
the required level of certainty to a "slight possibility" can al-
ways be justified. 233 But when the threat is less serious or 
less immediate, the level of justification can rise accordingly. 
For example, a one percent chance of skyjacking might justify 
the use of skymarshals, but when the government wishes to 
inspect a citizen's garbage for marijuana residue, a ten percent 
possibility of success might be required. Ten percent likelihood 
is still quite low, but it exceeds the Court's current approach 
which holds that government intrusion into garbage is a non-
search and thus requires absolutely no justification.234 
Bringing former "non-searches" within the scope of the amend-
ment insures that the police have some rational basis for their 
actions, and the sufficiency of that rationale (the odds of sue-
231 
"The heart of the Fourth Amendment, the argument runs, is a severe re-
quirement of specific justification for any intrusion upon protected personal securi-
ty, coupled with a highly developed system of judicial controls to enforce upon the 
agents of the State the commands of the Constitution." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
11 (1968). 
232 See Amsterdam, supra note 223, at 393 ("A sliding scale approach would 
considerably ease the strains that the present monolithic model of the fourth 
amendment almost everywhere imposes on the process of defining the 
amendment's outer boundaries."). 
233 
"When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of 
dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, 
that danger alone meets the test of reasonableness, so long as" the procedures 
involved are reasonable. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 
656, 675 n.3 (1989) (quoting United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2nd 
Cir. 1974)). 
234 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988). 
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cess) can vary according to the nature of the threat and the 
degree of intrusion upon privacy or liberty. 
EXTREMELY INTRUSIVE GoVERNMENT ACTION 
In addition to bringing former "non-searches" within the 
amendment's coverage (albeit at the lowest level of required 
certainty), I also propose open acknowledgment of the highest 
level of certainty required in extraordinary cases,235 i.e., rec-
ognition that the normal level of probable cause is not suffi-
cient to justify abnormal intrusions. The Court has recognized 
this principle in connection with police use of deadly force 
against a suspect236 and the surgical probing for evidence,237 
situations that "are unusual because of the degree of violence 
involved in the search or seizure."238 
Like all other levels of required justification, this highest 
level should be flexible enough to accommodate extreme threats 
and extreme measures of protection against such threats. This 
category might be utilized to help resolve a classic, but again 
current,239 quandary for a free society--can torture ever be 
used to uncover and prevent a threatened mass disaster, for 
example, the location of a pirated atomic bomb smuggled into 
the United States by terrorists. The fundamental question of 
whether torture is ever permissible is not a Fourth Amendment 
question. Any absolute limitations on balancing individual 
rights against the collective good are better addressed by due 
235 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996) ("Where probable 
cause has existed, the only cases in which we have found it necessary actually to 
perform the 'balancing' analysis involved searches or seizures conducted in an ex-
traordinary manner."). Justice Marshall, however, disdained the "extraordinary 
manner" language, and espoused a much broader view of the flexible nature of 
probable cause-"[i]t is by now established Fourth Amendment doctrine that in-
creasingly severe standards of probable cause are necessary to justify increasingly 
intrusive searches." Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 464 (1974) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). 
236 Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
237 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). 
238 Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment Reason-
ableness, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1650 (1998). 
239 See Alan M. Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor 
Strauss, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 275 (2004); Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 201 (2004). 
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process considerations. 240 But assuming that torture is ever 
acceptable, we certainly would not permit torturing a suspect 
based on a slight possibility of some terrorist act. We might, 
however, act differently when faced with a ninety percent cer-
tainty that detonation of the pirated bomb is imminent. 
Recognizing this highest level of required certainty is the 
mirror image of recognizing the lowest level of certainty that 
should be made applicable to former "non-searches." With these 
newly recognized bookends in place, we can sandwich in three 
currently existing standards and create a five tiered model of 
the levels of certainty required for searches and seizures. 
TIERED MODEL OF THE LEVELS OF CERTAINTY REQUIRED FOR 
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
The parenthetical numbers following each category are 
largely arbitrary and necessarily vague, but they help give 
some level of concreteness to what might otherwise be an over-
ly theoretical model. At a minimum, such numbers place the 
hierarchy of these categories beyond dispute. 241 
1) Slight possibility 
2) Reasonable suspicion 
3) Fair probability 
(1% to 10%) 
(20% to 40%) 
(40% to 49%) 
240 See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 773 (2003) ("The Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause, rather than the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrim-
ination Clause, would govern the inquiry in those cases" involving "police torture 
or other abuse that results in a confession."); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 
172-7 4 (1952) (noting evidence obtained by methods that are "so brutal and so 
offensive to human dignity" that they "shock the conscience" violate the Due Pro-
cess Clause). 
241 For example, when watching an Olympic diving event, I might disagree 
with the judges whether a particular dive merited an eight rather than a nine, 
but at least there is no uncertainty that eight is lower than nine. The Court, 
however, sometimes confuses the hierarchical relationship between belief and 
suspicion. See supra text accompanying note 53. In general, the Court has shown 
a disturbing tendency to coin a new phrase (e.g., non-whimsical suspicion, clear 
indication, etc.) to resolve each new or difficult factual situation. "[C]ourts should 
clear up their domains where the decision makers cannot tell which standard 
prevails or what the prevailing standard means." Clermont, supra note 82, at 
1151. 
2004) THE ODDS ON PROBABLE CAUSE 339 
4) More likely than not (51 %)242 
5) High probability (80% to 100%) 
CONCLUSION 
My examination of mathematical definitions of probable 
cause has been less of a tease than the oral arguments in 
Pringle, although I do stop short of endorsing precise mathe-
matical expressions of probable cause. Too much precision 
diminishes the resources of ambiguity, and as Aristotle cau-
tioned, "(w]e must not look for the same degree of accuracy in 
all subjects; we must be content in each class of subjects with 
accuracy of such a kind as the subject matter allows."243 
In some settings, the required level of certainty can be 
expressed with a fair amount of mathematical precision. For 
example, the law could specify whether a drug sniffing dog 
must have an established track record of reliability in the 30%, 
40%, 50% range, and so on. But in the absence of a precisely 
measured track record, "in the ordinary task of unaided catego-
rization of amorphous probability . . . we can at best make 
little more than an imprecise stab at judgment. "244 In recogni-
tion of human cognitive limitations, these stabs at judgment 
should be limited and structured into manageable categories of 
probabilities. Five such categories may or may not be the magic 
number, but they are preferable to the unacceptable complexity 
of balancing the totality of the circumstances,245 or the other 
242 Professor LaFave grudgingly conceded that some arrests could be made on 
less than a fifty-one percent probability, i.e., the classic hypothetical where police 
encounter a dead man and two bystanders who each accuse the other of murder-
ing the victim. He insisted, however, that if the police were permitted to arrest 
"upon a less than 50% probability that a crime has even occurred, then this 
would open up the possibility that police would generally arrest persons engaged 
in activity which was only equivocal," a practice that would result in many intru-
sions into the freedom and privacy of innocent persons. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE-A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.2(e) (3d ed. 
1996). 
243 FRANK, supra note 119, at 194 (quoting Aristotelian lines). 
244 Clermont, supra note 82, at 1146. 
••• "The factors in the balancing test have become mere shells, manipulated to 
justify unguided conclusions as to what the majority in any given case concludes 
is reasonable." Clancy, supra note 116, at 585. 
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extreme of a "one size fits all" approach to probable cause.246 
"While the Court has never embraced a case-by-case sliding 
scale of probable cause, it has implicitly adopted a category-by-
category sliding scale."247 
In summary, my view of the flexible nature of probable 
cause rests on a string of theoretical and pragmatic acknowl-
edgments: probable cause must be seen as but one form of 
justification for searches and seizures; all justifications reflect 
compromises that resolve conflicting government and individual 
interests; the same compromise is not mandated in all cases; 
thus, the required degree of certainty becomes a flexible stan-
dard that is part of the balance or compromise itself. 
Given the countervailing needs for both clarity and calibra-
tion, for rules and standards, a categorical proportionality ap-
proach to probable cause will not arrive at many "bright line" 
rules. My five-tiered approach to the levels of certainty re-
quired for searches and seizures draws a line that is obviously 
subject to attack248 (or further refinement). But by adjusting 
the odds to reflect the varying interests at stake, perhaps we 
can make the best possible gamble--one in which both sides 
Wlll. 
248 
"Still, whatever the best possible regime is, it seems hard to believe that 
the current approach---one category for all crimes-makes sense." Stuntz, supra 
note 149, at 870 n.93. 
247 Thomas, supra note 202, at 531. 
248 
"[I]t is too hard to invent categories without giving short shrift to details 
that turn out to be important in a given instance, and without inflating marginal 
ones." United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003). 
